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LAND IS NOT THE NEW OIL: WHAT THE
NIGERIAN OIL EXPERIENCE CAN TEACH SOUTH
SUDAN ABOUT BALANCING THE RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF LARGE SCALE LAND ACQUISITION
Scott P. Stedjan∗

“The only reason why we are hungry is because of how we have been investing in
Agriculture.” – Ann Itto, South Sudan’s Minister of Agriculture1
“When food becomes scarce, the investor needs a weak state that does not force
him to abide by any rules.” – Phillepe Heilberg of Jarch Capital2
Recent global food price volatility combined with the growing
use of agricultural land to produce biofuels has sparked a global
scramble for land.3 Precise numbers are difficult to verify, but the
scale of new international land investment in recent years is, by all

∗ Scott Stedjan graduated in 2014 with a J.D. from the Penn State
Dickinson School of Law. He was the Editor-in-Chief of the Penn State Journal of
Law and International Affairs (JLIA). Scott previously worked for a large
international NGO where he managed a policy portfolio that included South
Sudan.
1 SPLM Leaders Call for More Investments in Agriculture in Upper Nile, SPLM
TODAY, July 11, 2008,
http://splmtoday.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=106&Ite
mid=1.
2 Horand Knaup & Juliane von Mittelstaedt, The New Colonialism Foreign
Investors Snap Up African Farmland, DER SPIEGEL, July 30, 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-new-colonialism-foreigninvestors-snap-up-african-farmland-a-639224.html.
3 Lesley Wroughton, Oxfam Urge World Bank to Freeze Land Investments,
REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2012, 5:40 AM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/worldbank-oxfam-landidUSL1E8L2LKF20121004.

2015

Scott Stedjan

3:2

accounts, enormous.4 Compared to an average annual expansion of
international investment in global agricultural land of less than four
million hectares before 2008, the World Bank estimates that
approximately fifty-six million hectares worth of new large-scale
farmland deals were announced in 2009 alone.5
Developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan
Africa, are the main targets for investors.6 These countries are
enticing because land in Sub-Saharan Africa is relatively cheap and
available, the climate is favorable to crop production, and labor is
inexpensive.7 According to the International Land Matrix project,8
since 2001, governments and international investors acquired land

See WARD ANSEEUW ET AL., THE LAND MATRIX PARTNERSHIP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAND DEALS FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH:
ANALYTICAL REPORT BASED ON THE LAND MATRIX DATABASE 7 (Tim Bending
ed., Apr. 2012), http://www.landcoalition.org/en/publications/transnational-landdeals-agriculture-global-south (International investors have acquired 56.2 million
hectares in Africa since 2001); Are Foreign Investors Colonizing Africa, AL JAZEERA,
Oct. 25, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y05fzp0YSrw (Foreign
investors bought or leased a land area in sub-Saharan Africa about the size of
France in 2009 alone).
5 KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., WORLD BANK, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST
IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS xiv (2011).
6 Id. at xiv (noting that more than seventy percent of the demand has
been in Africa).
7 OLIVER DE SHUTTER, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
THE RIGHT TO FOOD, LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITIONS AND LEASES: A SET OF
CORE PRINCIPLES AND MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE
3 (June 11, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/site/%20swacmali2010/44031283.pdf.
8 The Land Matrix is an online public database that permits the public to
contribute data on land deals. The Land Matrix facilitates the collection and
representation of data; encourages citizens, researchers, governments, and
companies to provide data and improve the quality of and access to data; and
provides a regular and accessible analysis of trends. It is supported by nonprofit
organizations as well as the Government of the Netherlands and the European
Commission. What is the Land Matrix, http://landmatrix.org/en/about/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2013).
4
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area in Africa equivalent to the northern U.S. plains states of North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska combined.9
Derided as “land-grabbing” by those opposed to the practice,
the phenomenon of large-scale acquisition of farmland by
governments and private investors sparked a global debate among
international organizations, investors, researchers, and global civil
society.10 Some analysts and institutions, like the World Bank, see the
growth of this trend as a potential opportunity for rural
development.11 They argue countries with large endowments of land,
but gaps in productivity, can harness the technologies and capital
associated with responsible international investment and expand
cultivated areas and agricultural productivity.12 Others, however, see
rapid acquisitions of crucial food-producing lands by foreign entities
as a threat to rural economies and livelihoods.13 These analysts argue
that the current trend of international land investment works against
the goals of increasing food security and ending global hunger
9 ANSEEUW, ET AL., supra note 4; see also How Much of Your State is Wet?,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/wetstates.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012) (reflecting the figures on U.S. area. The land area of North
Dakota (68,976 m2), South Dakota (75,885 m2), and Nebraska (76,872 m2)
combined is 221,773 m2. One square mile is 258 hectares. Thus, 221,773 m2 =
57.4 million hectares.).
10 See WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, LAND GRAB? THE
RACE FOR THE WORLD’S FARMLAND (Michael Kugleman & Susan L. Levinstein
eds., 2009),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_090629_Land%20Grab_r
pt.pdf; David Hallam, Foreign Investment in Developing Country Agriculture – Issues, Policy
Implications and International Response, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INT’L INV. (Dec. 7,
2009),
http://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/sites/responsibleagroinvestment.org/f
iles/OECD_RAI%20Issure_Policy%20Implications.pdf; see also Responsible Farmland
Investing? Current Efforts to Regulate Land Grabs Will Make Things Worse, GRAIN (Aug.
22,
2012),
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4564-responsible-farmlandinvesting-current-efforts-to-regulate-land-grabs-will-make-things-worse.
11 DEININGER ET AL., supra note 5, at 129-42.
12 Id. at 5.
13 DANIEL SHEPARD & ANURADHA MITTAL, THE GREAT LAND GRAB:
RUSH FOR WORLD’S FARMLAND THREATENS FOOD SECURITY OF THE POOR 6
(2009).
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because investors prioritize production of food for export over
supporting domestic food supplies.14 Still, others are generally
supportive of increased investment in farmland, but would prefer
these investments stop until appropriate laws, regulations, and
industry standards can be implemented to protect the rights of
farmers.15
As this article will detail, investors in African land often
encounter many of the same risks as investors faced during the
twentieth century scramble for oil and gas in Africa endured. The
story of oil and gas discovery in Africa has been, for the most part, a
tragic one. For years, the governments of oil producing countries in
Africa proved unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from the
negative consequences of foreign investment.16 At the same time,
many investors involved in the oil industry simply ignored the
damage they caused to communities and the environment.17 As a
consequence, African oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola, CongoBrazzaville, Cameroon, and Gabon have all been largely unable to
convert their oil wealth into broad-based economic growth.18
Combining weak state institutions with economies completely
dependent on the export of oil or minerals has shown to reduce
economic growth, feed corruption, and increase the risk of civil war.19
Investment practices by multinational corporations acting without
strong regulations in West Africa have led to devastating social and
Id. at 18.
See generally Kate Geary, Our Land, Our Lives: Time Out on the Global Land
Rush, OXFAM INT’L (2012),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-land-lives-freeze-041012en_1.pdf (advocating for the World Bank to institute a temporary freeze on
investments involving large-scale land acquisitions).
16 See infra Part II.
17 Simon Warikiyei Amaduobogha, Environmental Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in the Oil and Gas Sector, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN
NIGERIA 115, 131 (Festus Emiri & Gowon Deinduomo eds., 2009).
18 See Ian Gary & Terry Lynn Carl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Wealth
and
the
Poor,
CATHOLIC
RELIEF
SERVICES
(2003),
http://www.crs.org/publications/showpdf.cfm?pdf_id=183.
19 Matthew L. Norman, The Challenges of State Building in Resource Rich
Nations, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 173, 173 (2012).
14
15
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environmental consequences.20
In Nigeria, for example, oil
production since the late 1950s has damaged water and soil resources
so much that fishing, forestry, and agriculture are no longer possible
in large areas of the oil-producing region.21
Some governments and investors in the non-renewable
extractive industries22 have learned they could not simply ignore the
damage their business practices caused and took remedial action.23
According to economist Paul Collier, “Nigeria’s dysfunctional
management of its first oil boom of 1973–83 and its brilliant
management of the second boom of 2003–08 cautions against the
gloomy cynicism that until recently bedeviled investor thinking about
Africa.”24 Unfortunately, in many cases, the remedial steps taken
were too late to save the local environment, guard against corruption,
or protect investors’ reputations.25

20 See The Curse of Oil: The Paradox of Plenty, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://www.economist.com/node/5323394.
21 Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of
Transnational Corporations, and the Human Right to A Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 261, 271 (1997).
22 Nonrenewable extractive industries are those industries that are related
to the extraction of mineral and hydrocarbon products such as gold, diamonds, oil,
gas, etc. from the land and cannot be replaced. See OIL, GAS, AND MINING UNIT,
Extractive
Industries
Review
Reports,
WORLD
BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,co
ntentMDK:20306686~menuPK:592071~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSiteP
K:336930,00.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
23 David Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Sector: The
Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 69-70 (2011).
24 Paul Collier, The Case for Investing In Africa, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 3
(June 2010),
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_case_for_investing_in_Africa_2611.
25 See Spence, supra note 23, at 72 (“Shell eventually began to recognize
and address its reputational problem by undertaking social investment and making
concerted efforts to cultivate positive relationships with all of its important
stakeholders in Nigeria. However, by that time, much of the reputational damage
had been done. Despite pouring resources into social projects and stakeholder
relations in Nigeria in the 1990s and early 2000s, protests against Shell became
stronger and more organized.”).
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This article is intended to contribute to the global discussion
on international investment in African land by assessing lessons from
the experience of foreign investment in the Nigerian oil sector in the
later part of the twentieth century and applying these lessons to the
current situation of large-scale land investment in South Sudan. One
can derive many lessons about law, social policy, local governance,
and the moral responsibility of multi-national corporations from
studying the Nigerian oil experience. It is important to note,
however, the comparison between agriculture in South Sudan and the
extractive sector in Nigeria can only go so far. Developing policies
and legal relationships based on analogy may lead policymakers and
investors to ignore the peculiarities of each context.
This article will focus on the regulatory framework and legal
relationships between investors and governments, and furthermore,
will make suggestions on what type of frameworks and legal
relationship will be most beneficial for all parties involved in the
South Sudanese agricultural sector. Part I will explore the issue of
large scale land acquisitions by foreign investors in general and will
then focus on the phenomenon in South Sudan. Part I will also
examine who the investors are, the motivations for investment, the
possible threats to the people of South Sudan, and the risks borne by
investors. Part II will explain the economic and social impact of oil
investment in Nigeria during the second half of the twentieth
century. Part II will then examine the reforms pursued by the Federal
Government of Nigeria (FGN) and assess how litigation and
government action influenced the conduct of investors. Finally, Part
III will provide recommendations for investors and the Government
of South Sudan (GoSS) for establishing governance and legal
frameworks that will lead to benefits for both investors and the
African communities.
The story of land investment in Africa is just beginning to be
written. This article argues that the choices made by both investors
and governments will have profound implications for the future of
livelihoods and the global agricultural sector. Unless investors and
governments learn from the mistakes of previous investment in
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Africa’s abundant natural resources, there is little hope that largescale land investment will be mutually beneficial.

I.
A.

LAND INVESTMENT: RISKS AND REWARDS

The Scope and Context of International Land Investment

Global demand for energy, food, and water is expected to
accelerate over the next two decades. Three billion new middle-class
consumers are expected to emerge from poverty and move into
urban areas.26 This rise in demand already strains the agricultural
sector due to its indispensable role in supplying food and energy
needs.27 The rapid increases in demand for agricultural products have
caused price shocks and volatility as the market attempts to bring
supply and demand into proper alignment.28 Largely due to the rise

26 Richard Dobbs, et al., A New Era for Commodities, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY (Nov. 2011),
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/A_new_era_for_commodities_2887.
27 Production of biofuels, particularly ethanol and biodiesel for use in the
transport sector, has tripled since 2000 and is projected to double again within the
next decade. Regulations in the E.U., U.S., and Canada intended to mitigate
climate change, enhance energy security, and support the agricultural sector to
require the shift of agriculture land from food production to energy-related crops.
This has led to the merger of the energy and food markets and has contributed to
higher food prices as a whole. See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIOENERGY CHALLENGES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2 (Oct.
12, 2009),
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers%20/HLEF20
50_Climate.pdf/en/; WORLD BANK, RISING FOOD PRICES: POLICY OPTIONS AND
WORLD BANK RESPONSE 9 (2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/risingfoodprices%20_back
groundnote_apr08.pdf; INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., HIGH FOOD PRICES:
THE WHAT, WHO, AND HOW TO PROPOSED POLICY ACTIONS (May 2008),
www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/foodpricespolicyaction.pdf.
28 See Catherine Hornby, Food Prices to be Even More Volatile, UN Says,
REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2011, 3:57 PM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/us-food-pricesidUSTRE7995D720111010.
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in demand for agricultural products in China and India, and biofuel
policies in Europe and North America,29 the International Monetary
Fund’s food price index30 reflected price increases of 130% from
January 2002 to June 2008, and a staggering 56% between January
2007 and June 2008.31
While the numbers are alarming, rapid increases in demand
for energy and food is not new. Similar factors were observed
throughout the twentieth century, as the world’s population tripled.32
The difference is that during the twentieth century, however, prices
for primary commodities remained relatively stable.33 Economists
from the McKinsey Global Institute attribute the lack of price
volatility in the twentieth century to technological improvements
related to the Green Revolution.34

29 See DEREK HADLEY & SHENGGEN FAN, INT’L FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INST., REFLECTIONS ON THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: HOW DID IT
HAPPEN? HOW HAS IT HURT? AND HOW CAN WE PREVENT THE NEXT ONE? 165
(2010), http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/rr165.pdf (providing
a detailed account of the factors that led to the global food crisis of 2008).
30 For more information on the IMF Commodity Price Index, see IMF
Primary Commodity Prices: Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/faq/index.htm#q1 (last updated
Dec. 19, 2012).
31 Donald Mitchell, A Note on Rising Food Prices (July 2008), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/07/28/
000020439_20080728103002/Rendered/PDF/WP4682.pdf.
32 Id.
33 Dobbs, supra note 26, at 1.
34 The Green Revolution refers to the massive investments in modern
scientific research for agriculture in the mid-twentieth century, which were led by a
handful of American foundations, most prominently the Rockefeller Foundation.
This effort led to dramatic increases in agricultural yield, most notably in India.
For more information on the Green Revolution, see Amanda Briney, Green
Revolution: History and Overview of the Green Revolution, ABOUT (Oct. 12, 2014, 2:34
PM),
http://geography.about.com/od/globalproblemsandissues/a/%20greenrevolution.
htm.
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Had supply remained constant [in the twentieth
century], commodity prices would have soared.
Dramatic improvements in exploration, extraction,
and cultivation techniques kept supply ahead of everincreasing global needs, cutting the real price of an
equally weighted index of key commodities by almost
half. This ability to access progressively cheaper
resources underpinned a 20-fold expansion of the
world economy.35
Many investors see land as a unique investment opportunity
in the current environment. Because demand for food is inelastic,
some investors see land investments as secure assets at a time when
the global financial crisis has made other investments less profitable.36
With modest investment in technology and infrastructure, these
investors conclude that productivity in underutilized lands in the
developing world could potentially increase and, in turn, increase
food availability, lower prices, and lead to stable profits over the long
term.37
Private investors are not the only entities entering the market
for African land. Increasing food prices over the past decade have
led governments reliant on food imports to question the capacity of

Id.
ALEJANDRO LITOVSKY & PAULINA VILLALPANDO, EARTH SEC.
INITIATIVE, THE LAND SECURITY AGENDA: HOW INVESTOR RISKS IN FARMLAND
CREATE
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
SUSTAINABILITY
5
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.africafoicentre.org/index.php/reports-publications/8-the-landsecurity-agenda/file.
37 See CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LIONS ON
THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 8 (2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/mgi/research/productivity_competitiveness_and_growth/lions_on_the_
move (estimating that by bringing more land into production, adding technology to
increase yields, and shifts to a mix of both low-value crops and fruits and
vegetables, Africa could increase its agricultural output from $280 billion in 2010 to
$880 billion in 2030).
35
36
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global markets to provide food at a predictable price.38 Rich
countries that have land and water constraints, such as those in the
Persian Gulf, have leased or purchased large tracks of land in Africa
in pursuit of domestic food security.39 Likewise, countries with large
populations and food security concerns, such as China, South Korea,
and India, are looking to capitalize on investment opportunities in
food production overseas.40
Investors see Africa as the best place for land investment.
They see the land as plentiful and possessing massive potential for
economic growth.41 In fact, since 2001 more than half of
international land investment occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.42 The
interest in Africa is unsurprising; Africa is home to more than onequarter of the world’s arable land and sixty percent of the world’s
remaining uncultivated land, but generates only ten percent of global
agricultural output. Further, governments from across the continent
are making strenuous efforts to attract agricultural investments by
encouraging international access to historically national land
resources.43

Lorenzo Cotula & Sonjia Vermeulen, Deal or No Deal: The Outlook for
Agricultural Land Investment in Africa, 85 INT’L AFFAIRS 6, 1233, 1235 (2009).
39 JOACHIM VON BRAUN & RUTH MEINZEN-DICK, INT’L FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INST., “LAND GRABBING” BY FOREIGN INVESTORS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES:
RISKS
AND
OPPORTUNITIES
1
(Apr.
2009),
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bp013all.pdf.
40 Oliver de Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the
Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 515 (2011).
41 Kartik Jayaram et al., Africa’s Path to Growth, Sector by Sector, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY (June 2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/africas_
path_to_growth_sector_by_sector.
42 ANSEEUW, supra note 4.
43 David Hallam, International Investment in Agricultural Production, in LAND
GRAB? A RACE FOR THE WORLD’S FARMLAND 27, 27 (Michael Kugelman & Susan
L. Levenstein eds., 2011).
38
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The Republic of South Sudan, the world’s newest nation,44 is
among the most sought after locations for large-scale land
acquisitions.45 The semi-autonomous region of southern Sudan
emerged in 2005 after decades of war between the Government of
Sudan and the mostly southern-based Sudan’s People’s Liberation
Army. The peace agreement between the two parties ended the war
and created an interim “Government of southern Sudan.”46 Six years
thereafter, 98.83% of the people of southern Sudan voted in favor of
a Referendum on Southern Independence.47 As a result, the Republic
of South Sudan was formally established on July 9, 2011.48 Private
investors flocked to southern Sudan after the war ended49 mainly due
to its large size, low population density, and impressive natural
resource wealth.50 International investors were welcomed in southern
Sudan with eager partners within the GoSS, local public officials, and
community elites.51
South Sudan is a unique case, because it is a new country
struggling to recover from decades of war and internal violence
44 After a referendum held in January 2011, South Sudan declared its
independence on July 9, 2011. See Jeffery Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South
Sudan
Becomes
a
New
Nation,
N.Y. TIMES,
July
10,
2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=
1&.
45 See United Nations Mission in Sudan, Background to the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, UNITED NATIONS,
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
46 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberations Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Dec.
31, 2004,
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf.
47 Results for the Referendum for Southern Sudan, S. SUDAN REFERENDUM
COMMISSION, http://southernsudan2011.com/.
48 Gettleman, supra note 44.
49 DAVID
DENG & ANURADHA MITTAL, OAKLAND INST.,
UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA: COUNTRY REPORT, SOUTH
SUDAN 5 (Anuranda Mittel & Frederic Mousseau eds., 2011),
http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/%20OI_country
_report_south_sudan_1.pdf.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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between ethnic groups.52 The war seriously disrupted governance
and undermined social hierarchies and traditional authorities.53
Conflict continues to plague South Sudan. In December 2013,
political rivalries erupted into a major conflict between ethnic groups
in South Sudan.54 A ceasefire was signed in May 2014,55 but violence
remains and reports of serious human rights abuses continue to be
reported by aid organizations and human rights groups.56
The GoSS is faced with resolving disputes between its own
people through strengthening and rebuilding social institutions, while
at the same time creating state institutions and a legal regime basically
from scratch.57 Because South Sudan is going through a fundamental
shift in its governance systems and law, investors in South Sudan
operate under the ambiguity of the prevailing law and weak

See Jok Madut Jok & Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, Sudan’s Prolonged Second
Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities, 42 AFR. STUD. REV.
2 (1999).
53 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN LAND
COMMISSION, DRAFT LAND POLICY (Feb. 2011) (copy held by author H.E. Robert
Lado Lwoki).
54 Isma’il Kushkush, Three Days of Violence in South Sudan Leaves Scores Dead,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/africa/violence-in-southsudan.html?_r=0.
55 South Sudan rivals Kiir and Machar agree peace deal, BBC NEWS, May 10,
2014, 2:30 AM, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27352902.
56 Carol Odera, South Sudan Ceasefire Under Threat as Government and Rebels
Clash, REUTERS, July 20, 2014, 9:30 AM; see also Isma’il Kushkush & Nicholas
Kulish, Civilians Flea as Violence Worsens in South Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/africa/civilians-flee-as-violenceworsens-in-south-sudan.html.
57 See generally Florence Martin-Kessler & Anne Poiret, How to Build a
Country
From
Scratch,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
4,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/opinion/how-to-build-a-country-fromscratch.html (opinion article arguing that the nascent nation had just a few short
paved roads for a territory roughly the size of France; no infrastructure; no public
services to speak of; no justice system, let alone law or order; the area was lush with
weapons, rife with ethnic violence and in the midst of a tense divorce with its
northern half).
52
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government institutions.58 Operating in such a context comes with
many potential risks and rewards to both investors and the people of
South Sudan.59
B.

The Risks and Rewards for Investors of Land Investment in
Southern Sudan

All investments involve risk in the sense that any number of
events may unfold that lead to economic loss. This article will focus
on political and reputational risks. Political risks are “threats to the
profitability of a project that derive from some sort of governmental
action or inaction, rather than changes in economic conditions in the
marketplace.”60 Categories of political risk associated with land
investment may include: (1) civil unrest; (2) direct or indirect
expropriation of property; and (3) corruption.61 A forth type of risk
is the risk that a company will lose potential business because its
reputation or character has been called into question.62 Investors in
some countries may be faced with risks that fall under one or two of
these categories. In South Sudan, however, investors must grapple
with serious risks that fall under each of the four categories.

DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 42; see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L
DEVELOPMENT, LAND TENURE ISSUES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN: KEY FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOUTHERN SUDAN LAND POLICY (Dec. 2010),
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_Southern_S
udan_Findings_and_Recommendations.pdf (provides a detailed account of
tradition land ownership system and how the transitional period attempted to
adjust the land ownership system).
59 See Elizabeth Asiedu, On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?, 30 WORLD DEV. 107,107-11 (2002).
60 NOAH
RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 3 (2005).
61 Id. at 6 (Authors cite seven forms of political risks. Not all the risks
cited apply to land investment (such as currency risks and trade restrictions) and
some risks overlap in the context of land investment. Thus, for the purpose of this
article I have reduced the number of risks to three.).
62 Reputation
Risk,
THE
ONLINE
BUSINESS
DICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/reputationrisk.html#ixzz2HbAdhSQE.
58
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1. Civil Unrest. – The threat of civil unrest is the most serious
risk facing foreign investors in South Sudan. Although no longer at
war with its northern neighbor, violence and bloody conflict continue
to plague South Sudan.63 Political rivalries, social institutions
weakened by decades of war, pressures on land, and the prevalence
of small arms among the civilian population64 have enabled and
fueled violent conflicts. Conflicts between ethnic groups and among
pastoralists that in the past would be solved by traditional institutions
instead continue unabated.65 If the GoSS continues66 to be unable to
insulate business interests from the direct and indirect impact of
violence and civil strife, investors may find their property damaged or
they may not be able to carry on regular operations due to threats to
the workforce.67

See Robyn Dixon, South Sudan Violence Leaves Donors Disillusioned, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/01/world/la-fgsouth-sudan-governance-20140301 (detailing the concern by donors on the future
of state building in South Sudan); See also, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, SOUTH
SUDAN: A CIVIL WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME, Africa Report No. 217 (2014),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/south%20sudan/217-south-sudan-a-civil-war-by-any-other-name.pdf
(detailing the dynamics of the most recent civil conflict in South Sudan).
64 See generally Adam O’Brien, Shot in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan
Civilian Disarmament Campaign, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 10 (2009),
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBAWP-16-South-Sudan-Civilian-Disarmament-Campaign.pdf (author argues that “the
market for small arms thrives with strong demand and supply, undermining
stability and threatening the fragile peace.”).
65 See SCHOMERUS ET. AL, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS INSTITUTE
FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, SOUTH SUDAN AT ODDS WITH ITSELF: DYNAMICS
OF
CONFLICT
AND
PREDICAMENTS
OF
PEACE
9-10
(2010),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/businessAndConsultancy/LSEConsulting/pdf/southernSud
an.pdf; Jonah Leff, Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda
Border Region, 3 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 188, 191 (2009).
66 See Ashish Kumar Sen, Violence Mars Investment Scene in South Sudan,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/13/violence-mars-investmentscene-in-south-sudan/?page=all.
67 RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 19. Under international law, host
governments are not required to compensate for loss to the investor caused by
non-governmental actors, though this sort of risk is usually insurable.
63
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Outside of violence, political or social unrest spurred by
large-scale land investment is a serious risk in South Sudan. The right
of communities to exercise ownership and control over their land
was at the heart of the Southerners’ demands during the civil war.68
Because communities endured hardship throughout the war, many
believe they have earned the right to be involved with decisions
relating to the use of land held by the community.69 Any attempt to
adjust or undermine the rights of landholders is likely to face stiff
opposition from groups at the local level.70
2. Expropriation. – Under international law,71 host nations have
the sovereign right to expropriate assets and to regulate activities
within their jurisdiction.72 There are, however, some conditions to
the general rule: a taking is illegal unless it is (1) non-discriminatory;
(2) carried out for a public purpose; and (3) accompanied by full
compensation.73
In a classic expropriation situation, the host government
annuls the investor’s title to an asset acting under local law.74
Expropriation can also occur in indirect ways when no formal
transfer of ownership or control from an investor to the government
68
69
70
71

DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 15.
Id.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712

(1987).
72 The United Nations General Assembly expressed the principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in General Assembly Resolution
1803 in 1962. The Resolution declares that both people and nations have a right to
exercise sovereignty over natural resources in the area under which they have
sovereign control. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962);
see also Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People’s Ownership of Natural
Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. Rev. 33, 37 (2006) (arguing
the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources is vested in peoples, not
states, though states retain a pivotal role insomuch as government exercises the
right to permanent sovereignty).
73 G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 72, ¶4; see also, RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra
note 60, at 8.
74 The term “nationalization” is often used interchangeably with an
expropriation of this sort if the taking occurs across an entire industry.
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occurs.75 International arbitral tribunals over the past twenty years
have concluded that government measures that eliminate
substantially all of an investment’s value may constitute “regulatory
expropriation” or “indirect expropriation.”76 These tribunals held
that withholding operational permits promised to an investor after
the considerable funds have been expended, enacting legislation
requiring corporations to be structured in certain ways, or
establishing the investment land as a protected area could constitute
regulatory takings.77
The Investment Promotion Act of South Sudan of 2011
provides a guarantee against expropriation that should, in theory,
reduce the risk of direct expropriation.78 It states that “there shall be
no expropriation of any enterprise . . . unless the expropriation is in
the national interest for a public purpose, . . . is made on a nondiscriminatory basis, [and] in accordance with due process of law.”79
According to this Act, compensation will be given without delay and
the amount given will be determined by means agreed to by both the
Government and the person whose property has been expropriated.80

Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratter v. TAMS-AFF Consulting Eng’rs
of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 219 (1984).
76 See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/1, Arbitration Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000) 40 ILM 36 (2001)
(“Expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged transfer of title in favor of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host state.”).
77 See Metalclad, supra note 76; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Arbitration Award (May 29,
2003) 43 ILM 133; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Gov’t of the Islamic Rep. of Iran, 4
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 122 (1983).
78 The Investment Promotion Act of 2011, 34 (S. Sudan), Jan. 20, 2010,
http://www.oxfam.ca/sites/default/files/imce/country-profile-south-sudan.pdf.
79 Id. at 34 (2).
80 Id. at 34 (3-4).
75
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While the GoSS has addressed direct expropriations in the
Investment Promotion Act, the manner in which community land is
held in South Sudan, combined with the practice of other
governments in Africa raises some concerns for investors.81 The
Land Act of 200982 states that all land is owned by the people of
southern Sudan, and the Government is responsible for regulating its
use.83 When no tenure can be established, the land is designated as
public land and may be granted to investors by the Government.84
Public lands only represent a small fraction of South Sudanese land,
and management of most rural lands is given to customary
institutions.85 This situation differs from most African countries
81 The Government of Madagascar, for example, entered into a ninetynine-year lease for 3.2 million acres with a South Korean firm in 2009. The public
revolted against the agreement and helped lead to the fall of the Government of
Madagascar. The new leader almost immediately cancelled the deal with the South
Korean firm when he came into office. Madagascar Leader Axes Land Deal, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 19, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7952628.stm; see also
Anastasi Telesetsky, A New Investment Deal in Asia and Africa: Land Leases to Foreign
Investors, in EVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 1 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2012) (detailing the
expropriation experiences of other governments).
82 By discussing the Land Act I do not intend to provide an analysis of
land tenure issues in South Sudan. Rather, the Land Act forms the backbone of
the regulatory regime in land investment in South Sudan in the same way that the
Petroleum Act, discussed infra note 208, addresses oil production in Nigeria.
83 The Land Act of 2009 (S. Sudan) § 7 (copy on file with author).
Section nine of the Act classifies “land” as public, community, or private land. Id. §
9. Public land is land owned collectively by the people of South Sudan and held in
trust by the GoSS. Id. § 10. Public land includes land used by government offices,
roads, rivers, and lakes for which no customary ownership is established, and land
acquired for public use or investment. Id. § 73(5). Community land is land held,
managed, or used by communities based on ethnicity, residence, or interest.
Community land can include land registered in the name of a community, land
transferred to a specific community, and land held, managed, or used by a
community. Id. § 11. Private land includes registered freehold land, leasehold land,
and any other land declared by law as private land. Id. § 12.
84 The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 10(2)(ii)(b).
85 IS ACADEMY ON LAND GOVERNANCE, SOUTH SUDAN FOOD
SECURITY AND LAND GOVERNANCE FACTSHEET 4 (Apr. 2011),
http://www.landgovernance.org/system/files/Sudan%20%20Factsheet%20landac
%20april%202011.pdf (LANDac is a partnership between several organizations
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where the land is owned by the state.86 Establishing a land system
whereby communities are given ownership rights protects the rights
of communities, but makes allocating land for investment more
cumbersome.87
According to the Land Act, it is communities, not national or
state governments, that have the authority to allocate community
land rights for investment activity.88 The objective of this provision
was outlined in the 2011 Draft Land Policy, which states:
In many parts of the region, land holdings, large and
small, urban and rural, are being allocated . . . without
taking account of the rights of current landholders.
These practices reflect a disregard and in some cases
confusion over the proper land administrative
authorities to engage in when applying for land.
Some government officials have taken land allocation
decisions without consulting communities and
individuals who have ownership or use rights to the
land in question.89
These provisions of the Land Act and the Draft Land Policy
raise two red flags for land investors. First, the Draft Land Policy
unambiguously states that many land deals have been carried out in
an incorrect manner. This is, in part, due to the fact that state
governors across the country believe that attracting foreign
investment is among their top priorities and often do not strictly

involved in development-related research, policy and practice and supported by the
Government of the Netherlands).
86 Lorenzo Cotula, Land Deals in Africa: What is in the contracts?, INT’L INST.
FOR ENV’T & DEV. 16 (2011).
87 See generally Clemens Hoffman, The Contradictions of Development: Primitive
Accumulation and Geopolitics in the Two Sudans, in HANDBOOK OF LAND AND WATER
GRABS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER
SECURITY 454 (Tony Allan et al. eds., 2013).
88 The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 15.
89 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN, DRAFT LAND POLICY 2011,
1.6.7. (copy held by author).
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adhere to the law.90 At the same time, some communities have failed
to hold their state and local governments accountable because they
are reluctant to turn away foreign capital that may provide economic
opportunities.91 The lack of accountability, however, is beginning to
erode as communities are organizing and using the Government’s
rhetoric about community ownership to demand respect for their
interest in the land.92 These activities by the community increase the
risk of expropriation on the grounds that an established investment
violated the principles of the Land Act.
Second, the Land Act provision that grants the community
the authority to allocate community land poses some major
challenges to investors. Because South Sudanese communities are
rarely a cohesive unit, it is difficult for investors to determine who
may grant the land leases.93 South Sudanese communities are highly
mobile and often host a mix of groups.94 It is not uncommon for a
community to be comprised of those who have lived on community
lands for generations, those who have left the area during the war
and have recently returned and are claiming rights to the land, local
strongmen who claim ownership of an entire region, and those who
claim rights to land because they have historically enjoyed access to
the land for seasonal grazing purposes.95
In an example reported on by Financial Times and Rolling Stone
Magazine, a U.S. firm entered into a fifty-five year lease agreement for
400,000 hectares of land with Paulino Matip, a local warlord turned

David K. Deng, Competing Narratives of Land Reform in South Sudan, in
HANDBOOK OF LAND AND WATER GRABS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER SECURITY 454, 450 (Tony Allan et al. eds.,
2013).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Deng, supra note 90, at 450 (“communities are often fractured and
ambiguously defined entities”).
95 Id.
90
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deputy commander-in-chief of the army.96 The U.S. firm packed its
board with Southern Sudanese with strong political connections in
the hope that political connections could circumvent the need to
abide by the Land Act.97 Yet, the state governor did not believe the
General, or his family for that matter, owned the land.98 The leader
of the local county also knew nothing of the deal until nonprofit
researchers asked him about it.99 The investor believed that his
contract to the land was secure by the strength of General Matip.100
General Matip died in August of 2012,101 and it is unknown at the
time of writing whether the land deal has been or will be nullified.102
Even if investors find an authorized representative of a local
community with whom to negotiate, local governance systems have
been so severely undermined by years of war that leaders may not
have the capacity to manage land transactions.103 A particularly
extreme example of this occurred in 2008, when a Texas-based
company reportedly negotiated a forty-nine-year lease on 600,000
hectares in Lainay County, Central Equatoria State. Unfortunately
for the investor, Lainay County is comprised of only 340,000 hectares
and it is not clear how the investor was given rights to 600,000
hectares. This egregious example shows a lack of professionalism by
the investors, but also illustrates that some “leaders” in South Sudan’s
rural areas either do not understand the scale of the deals in which

96 Javier Blas & William Wallis, U.S. Investor Buys Sudanese Warlord’s Lands,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, 11:18 PM, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4cbe81e-de8411dd-9464-000077b07658.html#axzz2HGEDrED8; McKenzie Funk, Will Global
Warming, Overpopulation, Floods, Droughts, and Food Riots Make this Man Rich? Meet the
New Capitalists of Chaos, ROLLING STONE, May 27, 2010; see also FRED PEARCE, THE
LAND GRABBERS: THE NEW FIGHT OVER WHO OWNS THE EARTH 42 (2012).
97 Funk, supra note 96.
98 Deng, supra note 90, at 452.
99 Id.
100 Funk, supra note 96.
101 South Sudan’s Paulino Matip Dies in Kenya, BBC NEWS, Aug. 22, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19346831.
102 Email from David Deng, Research Director of South Sudan Law
Society, to Author (Jan. 2, 2013, 9:37 EST) (on file with author).
103 Deng, supra note 90, at 449.
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they are entering or are making illusionary agreements in order to
make a quick fortune.104
3. Corruption. – Corruption of both the local decision-making
mechanism and the larger political apparatus of the host state can
have a significant impact on the establishment and operation of a
foreign investment.105 Government officials may require a bribe
before signing investment agreements, may require fees for access to
important decision-makers, or may sell land they do not actually
own.106 Investors may decide to pay these bribes or fees for several
reasons, most notably, because many projects would not ultimately
occur without payment.107 Yet, if an investor decides to work within
a corrupt system, it opens the investor up to liability under both
national and multilateral anti-corruption enforcement measures.108
Corruption is rampant in South Sudan. The President of
South Sudan admitted publicly in 2012 that South Sudanese
Government officials had stolen close to $4 billion since the end of
the civil war.109 This amounts to about twenty percent of the
country’s annual GDP.110 Corruption in South Sudan is caused by
personal greed, but is also seen by some leaders as a necessary evil in
a time of political instability.111 According to a Reuters special report

Id. at 451.
See RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 22.
106 Id.
107 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Kimberly Ann Elliott, ed., 1997),
http://www.iie.com/
publications/chapters_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf (highlighting the economic
opportunities found in corrupt environments).
108 Id. at 48.
109 South Sudan Officials ‘Stole $4bn’, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18326004.
110 According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the GDP of
South Sudan in 2011 was $21.12 billion. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: SOUTH SUDAN,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/od.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
111 See Leonardo R. Arriola, Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, 42
COMP. POLITICAL STUD. 1339 (2009).
104

105
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from 2012, “the rulers of the world’s newest nation have fostered a
system of patronage and reward to provide short-term stability in this
vast and ethnically diverse country. But that has fuelled rampant
corruption that undermines the stated ideals of the country’s
liberators and its foreign backers.”112
The Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission Act of
2009 governs anti-corruption efforts in South Sudan.113 This Act
establishes an independent commission “responsible for the
investigation of cases of corruption with a view to protecting public
property and combating administrative malpractices in public
institutions.”114 The Commission’s role was further clarified in the
Transitional Constitution in 2011, which states:
without prejudice to the powers of the Ministry of
Justice in public prosecution, the Commission shall,
inter alia, (a) protect public property; (b) investigate
cases of corruption involving public property and
public interest; and it shall submit such investigation
to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution; (c) combat
administrative malpractices in public institutions; and
(d) pursuant to the provisions of Article 121 (1)
herein, require all persons holding such public offices
to make confidential formal declarations of their
income, assets and liabilities.115

112 Hereward Holland & Pascal Fletcher, Special Report - In South Sudan,
Plunder Preserves a Fragile Peace, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2012, 6:35 AM,
http://uk.reuters.com/article
/2012/11/20/uk-south-sudan-governors-idUKBRE8AJ08K20121120.
113 Anti-Corruption
Commission Act of 2009 (S. Sudan),
http://southsudanngoforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/AntiCorruption%20Commission%20Act%202009.pdf.
114 Id. § 6(1).
115 THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
SUDAN § 20 (2011),
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/South%20Sudan/South%20Sudan_Trans
itional_constitution_2011.pdf.
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While the Interim Constitution grants the Commission the
power to prosecute cases of corruption, some analysts argue that this
rarely occurs in practice.116 Some attribute the failure of the
Commission to prosecute cases to the lack of clear lines demarcating
the role of the Justice Ministry and the Commission.117 The failure to
establish clear lines has contributed to a situation where the
Commission has the authority to prosecute corruption but lacks the
experienced staff and political will to be an effective anti-corruption
entity.118
Recent attacks on activists and officials who publicized
corruption raise serious questions about the will of the GoSS to
combat corruption within its ranks.119 However, the current state of
affairs may not continue and investors cannot become complacent.
The GoSS is under intense pressure to crack down on corruption and
is receiving ample support from the international community to
strengthen its anti-corruption capabilities.120 These pressures and
116 Mut Turuk, South Sudan: Anti-Corruption Commission, Functions and
Effectiveness, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 2012,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43878.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See Alan Boswell, American Expelled from South Sudan for Anti-Corruption
Work,
MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS,
Aug.
20,
2012,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/20/162893/american-expelled-fromsouth-sudan.html; Hereward Holland, Anti-Graft Activist Kidnapped for 2 Days in
South
Sudan,
REUTERS,
July
14,
2012,
12:18
PM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/14/southsudan-corruptionidAFL6E8IE15H20120714.
120 See GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2011-2013
(2011), http://www.jdt-juba.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/South-Sudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf
(providing government’s plan to use donor funding to combat corruption); see
generally U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., SOUTH SUDAN OPERATIONAL PLAN 20112015
(2011),
http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SouthSudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf; U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.,
TRANSITION PLAN FOR SOUTH SUDAN 2011-2013 (2011),
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/policy_planning_and_learning/documents/
SouthSudanTransitionStrategy2011-13.pdf (detailing the plans of two major
development donors for anti-corruption assistance).
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inducements may lead to more investigations and more oversight of
investment deals.
U.S. land investors must worry about more than just
corruption from within, and possible enforcement efforts taken by
the GoSS. U.S. investors must strictly adhere to anti-bribery
regulations on international investments placed on them by the U.S.
Government. Chief among the U.S. regulations that apply to largescale land acquisition in Africa is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 (FCPA).121 Additionally, thirty-nine countries, including the
United States, have adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (AntiBribery Convention), which mirrors the FCPA in many ways.122
Land investment in South Sudan is particularly ripe for FCPA
violations.
Democracies with weak legal systems, endemic
corruption, and poor infrastructure pose significant FCPA risks.123
As many non-U.S. persons or entities vying for land in South Sudan
come from countries with no FCPA counterpart,124 they may be
permitted to bribe local officials and place U.S. persons or firms at a
competitive disadvantage in securing leases. In such an environment,
15 U.S.C § 78dd-1 (1998). The FCPA makes it unlawful for certain
classes of U.S. persons and entities to make payments to foreign government
officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business. A detailed explanation and
analysis of the FCPA is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed account see
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE
U.S.
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
11
(2012),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121114101438198031.pdf.
122 Conv. on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Int’l
Business Trans., Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 ILM 1,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/antibriberyconvention/38028044.pdf.
123 Lucinda A. Low & John E. Davis, Coping with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: A Primer for Energy and Natural Resource Sectors, 16 ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 286, 287 (1998).
124 Parties to the Conv. on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in Int’l Bus. Trans. does not include China or any Middle Eastern country. South
Africa is the only African country that has ratified the Convention. For a full list of
state parties, see Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD (Sept. 20, 2014)
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/.
121
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U.S. investors may feel compelled to resort to paying bribes in order
to not lose the investment opportunity.125 Violations of the FCPA
can lead to large civil and criminal penalties, sanctions, and remedies,
including fines, disgorgement, and/or imprisonment.126 Thus,
international investors must take the law seriously and develop both
internal compliance programs and transaction-specific safeguards.127
4. Litigation and Reputational Risks. – According to the Interim
Constitution of South Sudan, “the right to litigation shall be
guaranteed for all persons; no person shall be denied the right to
resort to courts of law to redress grievances whether against
government or any individual or organization.”128 If the courts of
South Sudan follow the example of the courts of other African
countries, it is likely that investors in South Sudan face a risk of
litigation and the associated risk to the investor’s global reputation.
It is too soon to determine how South Sudan’s nascent legal
system will address potential litigation against land investors.
However, courts of other African countries have begun to broaden
the legal liability of international corporations operating in their
country.129 There has been a growth in litigation against transnational
corporations in Africa over the past two decades,130 which in large
part can be attributed to campaigns by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and media reports about the damage inflicted
by oil and mining companies in Africa.131 The globalization of media
Low & Davis, supra note 123.
Id. at 315.
127 Id. at 315.
128 THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
SUDAN § 20 (2011),
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/The_Draft_Transitional_Constitution_
of_the_ROSS2-2.pdf.
129 Jedrzej George Frynas, Social and Environmental Litigation against
Transnational Firms in Africa, 42 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 363, 371 (2004).
130 See id. (Between 1981 and 1986, Nigerian courts heard 24 claims
against Shell Oil. In early 1998, Shell was reportedly involved in over 500 cases.
Chevron was involved in only 50 cases in the entire 1980s and by the end of the
1990s was involved in over 200 cases).
131 Id.
125
126
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and the rise of new technologies, such as the Internet and cellular
phone cameras, enabled NGOs to detect and publicize wrongdoing
with speed and efficiency never seen before.132 These campaigns
have generally made judges more responsive to those injured by the
acts of oil and mining companies.133
While awards given by African courts are relatively small
compared to American or European courts,134 there is great risk of
damage to a company’s reputation. Even if the investor or company
obtains a legal victory, the damage inflicted upon its reputation may
outweigh the liability of a lawsuit. Damage to a brand can eliminate
millions of dollars from a company’s share value, initiate consumer
boycotts, and even result in serious recruitment problems.135
According to a survey of major corporations by the Economist
magazine’s intelligence unit, companies found reputational problems
to be the most costly form of risk in financial terms.136 Among those
who had faced reputational problems, twenty-eight percent described
the financial toll as major.137
C.

The Risks of Land Investment in Southern Sudan for
Communities

Other articles and books have comprehensively addressed the
threats to the rights of communities posed by the wave of large-scale
land acquisition in Africa.138 Some studies argue that international
land investment contributes to food insecurity,139 environmental
David Spence, supra note 23, at 61-62.
See generally Frynas, supra note 128, at 375 (quoting the Nigerian Chief
Justice of the High Court in 1989, “Judges . . . are more aware now of oil industry
than thirty years ago. . . . The judge cannot be isolated from what is currently going
on in society in line with a particular subject.”); Id.
134 Id. at 373.
135 Richard Boele, Heike Fabig & David Wheeler, Nigeria and the Ogoni II:
A Study in Unsustainable Development, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 121, 125 (2001).
136 Reputation: Risks of Risk, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Dec.
2005), http://www.acegroup.com/eu-en/assets/risk-reputation-report.pdf.
137 Id.
138 See de Schutter, supra note 40, at 503.
139 See, e.g., Geary, supra note 15.
132

133
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degradation,140 corruption, lack of benefits for small-scale farmers,141
and the possibility of eviction and displacement.142 Because many of
the risks to communities have been covered by other studies, this
article will only focus on the most serious risks: social turmoil and
armed conflict due to corruption and lack of benefits flowing to the
local population.
South Sudan desperately needs investment in the agricultural
sector.
According to a World Food Program 2012 assessment,
thirty percent of South Sudanese households are either moderately or
severely food insecure.144 About forty-four percent of households
receive at least one form of food-related assistance, such as food aid
or seeds.145 Approximately eighty-five percent of South Sudanese are
involved in agriculture for their livelihood and almost all South
Sudanese are small-scale subsistence farmers.146 Because subsistence
farmers do not produce food for the local market, much of the food
found in South Sudan’s urban markets is imported from Uganda,
143

140 See,
e.g.,
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
OF
PROFESSIONAL
ENVIRONMENTALISTS (NAPE) / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH UGANDA, LAND, LIFE
AND JUSTICE: HOW LAND GRABBING IN UGANDA IS AFFECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT, LIVELIHOODS, AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY OF COMMUNITIES (Apr.
2012), http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2012/land-grabbingcases-uganda/view.
141 See, e.g., Cotula & Vermeulen, supra note 38, at 1243.
142 See, e.g., de Schutter, supra note 40.
143 DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 42.
144 See generally WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, FOOD SECURITY ANALYSIS:
SOUTH SUDAN FOOD MONITORING COLLABORATIVE (Oct. 2012),
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp253180.pd
f (The World Food Programme uses the term food security as a composite
indicator that includes information on food consumption (Food Consumption
Score), coping strategies (Coping Strategy Index), relative expenditure on food and
reliability and sustainability of income sources).
145 Id. (detailing the food security situation in South Sudan in 2012).
146 Astrid R.N. Haas & Sarah Armstrong, South Sudan’s Greenbelt: Can
Tapping Agriculture Assets Become the New Nation’s Economic Elixir?, USAID
FRONTLINES (Sept./Oct. 2011),
http://transition.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_sep11/FL_sep11_SUDAN_
AGRICULTURE.html.
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Kenya, and other countries.147 According to the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), over the last three years, South
Sudan imported approximately $262 million worth of produce from
neighboring countries, half of which were fresh vegetables that could,
and should, be grown locally.148
The South Sudanese Government believes their best hope for
food security comes from increasing private investment.149
Experience around the world suggests that the central path toward
improving food security is through private investment and
entrepreneurship.150 Some analysts argue that if private investment is
properly channeled to support farming, South Sudan may be able to
increase its food production to target levels of one million metric
tons of cereal production annually.151 Private investment in
agriculture also has the potential to generate government revenues
through leases and tax revenues, create employment, and bring the
technology and know-how required to develop infrastructure.152
While private agricultural investment has the potential to
unlock broad scale economic growth and development, a lack of
meaningful consultations, low employment prospects, and the lack of
domestic food security may undermine support for the government’s
investment promotional activities and could lead to social turmoil
and even armed conflict.153 As stated earlier, the Land Act of 2009

147
148
149

Id.
Id.
See SPLM Leaders Call for More Investments in Agriculture in Upper Nile,

supra note 1.
CALVIN MILLER, U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE AGENCY, SOUTH
SUDAN
AGRICULTURAL
MARKET
INVESTMENT
1
(2008),
http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/521/3-4_sudancase_150en.pdf.
151 DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 10; see also GOVERNMENT OF
SOUTH SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2011-2013 (2011),
http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/South-SudanDevelopment-Plan-2011-13.pdf (listing development targets).
152 DEININGER, supra note 5, at 34-42.
153 See generally id. (arguing that rural populations have sacrificed so much
in order to control their community lands. Also, attempts to undermine
150
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promised a community-led process of agricultural development and
consultations with community leaders about land policy. Yet, there is
a danger the process of large-scale land acquisition will reflect a
“continuation of the war-time economy which was characterized by
capital flight, one-sided contracts that favor the foreign investor, and
the government prioritizing the need of the investor over the local
population.”154 According to a report by the aid organization
Norwegian People’s Aid, “generally speaking, there is a serious
deficiency in the extent to which communities are being consulted
regarding land investments.”155
Southern Sudanese expect large-scale investment to bring
jobs to the local population.156
Yet, many of the foreign
multinational entities investing in South Sudan plan to employ highly
mechanized types of farming that maximizes returns.157 Historic
evidence on the effects of foreign direct investment in agriculture
suggests the benefits of the investment do not materialize when the
investment uses highly mechanized production technologies.158
High-tech farming reduces the need to create local employment and
may have more adverse environmental impacts, such as a more rapid
depletion of water supplies and land degradation.159 Additionally,
benefits in the form of jobs are further limited should the investor
import labor to manage high-tech farming enterprises.160 It is

community land ownership are likely to face stiff opposition from groups at the
local level).
154 Deng, supra note 90, at 451.
155 DAVID K. DENG, NORWEGIAN PEOPLE’S AID, THE NEW FRONTIER,
A BASELINE SURVEY OF LARGE-SCALE LAND BASED INVESTMENT IN SOUTH
SUDAN 30 (Mar. 2011),
http://www.rtfn-watch.org/uploads/media/new_frontier_largescale_land_grab_sout_sudan.pdf.
156 Id. at 32 (explaining a case study where the company promised 6,000
jobs but only hired 600 and laid off most of these individuals after three years).
157 Deng, supra note 90, at 453.
158 HALLAM, supra note 10, at 7.
159 Id. at 7.
160 See generally Ward Anseeuw, Lorenzo Catula & Mike Taylor, Expectation
and Implications of the Rush for Land, in HANDBOOK OF LAND AND WATER GRABS IN
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common for investors to import management and skilled positions,
leaving locals with only seasonal and low paying jobs.161
Finally, there is a conflict inherent in international agricultural
investment in food insecure countries like South Sudan. Investors
typically wish to export agricultural yield in order to meet their own
food security needs or to obtain profits by selling the products on the
international market.162 Host countries, on the other hand, justify
large-scale land acquisition as necessary to meet the host country’s
own food security needs.163 Many of the contracts investigated by
researchers are silent on this issue and leave the investor free to
decide whether to export or sell on local markets.164 The choice to
mainly export agricultural products may result in increased social
costs.
The South Sudanese have high expectations about what
independence will bring in terms of development165 and demand a
“peace dividend” from their government.166 The people of South
Sudan expect land investment to create employment opportunities
and food security and expect to be involved in land ownership and
use decisions.167 Any attempt to remove communities from the
decision-making process will be faced with stiff opposition, and
possibly, armed conflict.168

AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER SECURITY 424,
(Tony Allan, et al., eds. 2013).
161 Id.
162 COTULA, supra note 86, at 38.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Press Release, Amid ‘Huge Expectations’ for Transition to
Democracy, South Sudan Will Need All Support It Can Get, Special Representative
Tells Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/10450 (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10450.doc.htm.
166 See ERIN MCCANDLES, UN PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE,
PEACE
DIVIDENDS
AND
BEYOND
24
(2012),
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peace_dividends.pdf.
167 DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 15.
168 Id. at 15.
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II. LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
IN NIGERIA
The experience of international engagement in the extractive
sectors in Africa is a cautionary tale for both host governments and
land investors. Experience has shown that African nations that are
rich in primary commodities, whether fossil fuels, minerals, timber,
or land, often fall prey to the “resource curse,”169 unless governments
and investors take certain steps to minimize risk.170 Competition for
control of revenues from primary commodity exports and rents
continues to fuel cycles of corruption, conflict, and poverty in many
African countries.171
Where large-scale resource exploitation
preceded the formation of a functional state, the effect of large-scale
commodity extraction has been negative, on average, and disastrous
in some cases.172 The risks of investment fueling corruption or

169 The “resource curse” thesis posits that there is a negative relationship
between dependency on natural resource endowments and economic development
in part due to the deleterious impact resource dependency has on institutional
quality. See generally TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS
AND PETROL STATES (1997); JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW M. WARNER,
NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (Harv. Inst. for
Int’l Dev., Development Discussion Paper No. 517a, 1995); CARLOS LEITE & JENS
WEIDMANN, DOES MOTHER NATURE CORRUPT? NATURAL RESOURCES,
CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMF WORKING PAPER WP/99/85 (1999)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9985.pdf.
170 See Norman, supra note 19, at 1-2.
171 See KARL, supra note 169.
172 Governments that rely on revenues from primary commodities face
risks for two main reasons: (1) rents and (2) price shocks. Rents are payments by
foreign entities to the government of a host country. Rents can come in the form
of oil leases, leases of land for plantations or agricultural development, or passage
rights through a canal. When a country allows foreign entities to exploit natural
resources, these rents form a large nontax income stream. Where a government
has little or no need for taxing its citizens, citizens lose the incentive to demand
accountability of those who spend the tax revenues, and consequently,
governments tend to be more corrupt. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Resource
Rents, Governance, and Conflict, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 625, 627 (2005); H.
Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of
Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 428, 428
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conflict is particularly acute in post-conflict settings where tensions
between groups linger, legal and other accountability mechanisms are
weak, and many military age men, still armed and fresh off the
battlefield, are looking for employment.173
Governments that rely on revenues from the export of
primary commodities are also susceptible to the deleterious effects of
price volatility.174 The global prices of primary commodities are more
volatile than other prices largely due to the impact of weather and
new discoveries on the supply of these products.175 Spikes and drops
in revenues can make economic management very difficult, often
resulting in over-spending and corruption when the price of the
commodity is high, and public sector debt and popular frustration
when the global price is low.176
The experience of international oil and gas companies in
Nigeria between 1973 and 1999 is often cited as the poster child for
poor management of primary commodity exploitation.177 When the
Nigerian civil war ended in 1970, the country began a thirty-year
period of almost uninterrupted military rule.178 Nigerian military
(M.A. Cook ed., 1970); Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil
Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 17 (2005).
173 Jill
Shankleman, Mitigating Risks and Realizing Opportunities:
Environmental and Social Standards for Foreign Direct Investment in High-Value Natural
Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10519, 10521 (2012).
174 Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 172, at 627.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See ANNEGRET MÄHLER, GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL AND
AREA STUDIES, NIGERIA: A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE RESOURCE CURSE?
REVISITING THE OIL-VIOLENCE LINK IN THE NIGER DELTA (Jan. 2010),
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf;
Carmen Gentile, Analysis: Nigeria’s Resource Curse, UPI, Feb. 14, 2008, 9:03 PM,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2008/02/14/AnalysisNigerias-resource-curse/UPI-82671203041007/.
178 See JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT AND
LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 42-43 (2000)
(arguing that between 1970-1999 there was only one civilian government in charge
of Nigeria. President Shenu Shagari held office from 1979-1983 but was
overthrown by a coup on December 31, 1983).
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dictators led the country down a path where the government became
almost entirely reliant on oil revenues.179 In 1970, twenty-six percent
of the government’s total revenue came from oil revenue.180 By the
end of military rule in 1999, oil revenues made up over eighty percent
of all government revenues.181 Despite the massive increase in oil
revenue, Nigeria in 1999 was one of the poorest counties in the
world.182 That year, Nigeria’s per capita GDP was thirty percent
lower than in 1965 despite oil revenues of roughly $350 billion during
the intervening period.183
In addition to the economic costs of oil dependency, the
people of the Niger Delta were routinely subjected to extra-judicial
executions, arbitrary detentions, and “draconian restrictions on the
rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly” by the
Nigerian security forces.184 These violations of human rights have
been committed principally in response to protests about the

179 See James Donnelly-Saalfield, Note, Irreparable Harms: How the
Devastating Effects of Oil Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by Nigerian Courts,
the African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
371, 373 (2009).
180 FRYNAS, supra note 178, at 26.
181 Id.
182 IMF
World
Economic
Outlook
Database,
Apr.
2000,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2000/01/data/ (Nigeria in 1999 was
the twenty-first poorest nation in the world with a per capita GDP of $279); See also
GB AYOOLA ET AL., COUNTRY SYNTHESIS REPORT PREPARED FOR THE WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000-2001, CONSULTATIONS WITH THE POOR: NIGERIA,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/3356421124115102975/1555199-1124138866347/nigeria.pdf (provides an assessment of
the poverty situation in Nigeria at the turn of the century).
183 SALA-I-MARTIN, XAVIER &, ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER 9804, ADDRESSING THE
NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN ILLUSTRATION FROM NIGERIA (2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804.pdf (in PPP terms, Nigeria’s per capita GDP
was $1,113 in 1970 and is estimated to have remained at US$1,084 in 2000).
184 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING
COMMUNITIES 1 (Jan. 1999),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf.
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activities of the multinational oil companies.185 Further, the
environment has been severely degraded by oil development. By one
estimate, the Niger Delta endured oil spills equivalent of the Exxon
Valdez disaster every year for fifty years.186
The FGN and multinational companies operating in Nigeria
learned from previous mistakes. At the turn of the century the
government and oil companies began to implement reforms and
change their behavior.187 These changes were intended to reduce
political risk for investors, build confidence in state institutions, and
ensure Nigeria’s natural resource wealth is used for the benefit of the
population. While Nigeria has a long way to go, these reforms have
begun to bear fruit.188
A.

Government Reforms

Since 1999, the FGN has been carrying out an ambitious
reform agenda that focuses on fiscal responsibility,189 transparency
and accountability, development, and privatization.190 The specific
Id.
Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf, A Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html?_r=0.
187 See Nigeria: Sustaining the Momentum for Growth, WORLD BANK (Aug. 1,
2009), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/08/11516615/nigeriasustaining-momentum-growth.
188 See Collier, supra note 24, at 3.
189 See
generally NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION (NIGERIA),
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Nigeria_PRSP%28Dec2
005%29.pdf (outlining the National Strategy for reform, focusing on four main
areas: improving the macroeconomic environment, pursuing structural reforms,
strengthening public expenditure management, and implementing institutional and
governance reforms); see also Investment and Securities Act, No. 29 (2007)
(Nigeria),
http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/20090915470014THE%20INVESTMENTS%20AN
D%20SECURITIES%20Act%202007.pdf.
190 World Bank, supra note 187; see also Pat Utomi et al., Nigeria—The
Political Economy of Reform: Strengthening the Incentives for Economic Growth, THE POLICY
PRACTICE (Oct. 2007), http://thepolicypractice.com/papers/10.pdf.
185
186
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reforms that can most effectively teach governments and investors
involved in large-scale land acquisition are discussed below.
1. Anti-corruption and Transparency Measures. – When the
administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office in
1999, corruption “had eaten deep into the entire fabric of the
Nigerian society.”191
President Obasanjo promised to fight
corruption during his election campaign, and Section 15(5) of the
new Constitution of 1999 required that the state abolish corrupt
practices and abuses of power.192 Accordingly, the first legislation
President Obasanjo brought to the National Assembly was the
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act of 2000.193 The
Legislature subsequently enacted the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission Act of 2004194 establishing the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission.195
The Corrupt Practices Act made it a crime for government
officers to ask for or receive any benefit for their governmental duties
outside of government salary.196 The Act further criminalizes bribery
by any individual of a public official,197 and makes the failure of a
government official to report an attempted bribe punishable by a fine
A. Irene Pogoson, Globalization and Anti-Corruption Reform in Nigeria:
2003-2007, in ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN NIGERIA SINCE 1999: ISSUES,
CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD 59, 65 (David U. Enweremadu & Emeka
E. Okafor eds. 2009).
192 Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999),
http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm;
Osita Nnamani Ogbu, Combating Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Laws,
Institutions, and the Political Will, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 100 (2008).
193 See Ogbu, supra note 192, at 100; see also Corrupt Practices and other
Related Offenses Act No. 5 (2000) (Nigeria), http://www.nigerialaw.org/Corrupt%20Practices%20and%20other%20Related%20Offences%20Act
%202000.htm [hereinafter Corrupt Practices Act].
194 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act § 1
(2004) (Nigeria),
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Economic%20And%20Financial%20Crimes%20
Commission%20(Establishment)%20Act.htm.
195 Id.
196 Corrupt Practices Act § 8(1).
197 Id. §§ 18, 23 (related to contract awards).
191
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or a prison term not exceeding two years or both.198 The Act gives
the power to investigate corruption to an Independent Corrupt
Practices Commission.199 After concerns arose over the political
independence of the Commission, an amendment to the Corrupt
Practices Act in 2002 clarified the roles and responsibilities of the
Commission and gave the power to prosecute offenses under the Act
to the Attorney-General.200 Some analysts bemoan the lack of
political will by the government to fight corruption201 and how that
has stalled the effective implementation of the Act.202 However,
others argue the Act fills a necessary gap in the Nigeria’s anticorruption regime and is “a strong step towards the eradication of
corrupt practices in Nigeria.”203
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of 2004
ambitiously attempts to eradicate “non-violent and illicit activity
committed with the objective of illegally earning wealth.”204 Financial
crimes include money laundering, contract scams, counterfeiting, and
fraud.205 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has been
a resounding success.206 In its first year the Commission recovered
over $700 million, arrested more than 500 notorious criminals, and

Id. § 22.
Id. § 3.
200 See Ogbu, supra note 192, at 130-31 (arguing that this was a bad
decision and that the Commission should be given the concurrent power to
prosecute corruption).
201 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL POLITICS: VIOLENCE,
GODFATHERS, AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 31 (Oct. 12, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/nigeria1007webwcover.pdf.
202 Ogbu, supra note 192, at 128-29.
203 Ijeoma I. Opara, Nigerian Anti-Corruption Initiatives (Berkeley Electronic
Press Working Paper No. 1392) (2006),
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6368&context=expresso.
204 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act §
46, cited in Ogbu, supra note 192, at 131-34.
205 Id. § 6.
206 Ogbu, supra note 192, at 134.
198
199
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investigated and prosecuted high profile cases such as the former
Inspector General of the Police.207
In addition to national legislation, Nigeria was the first
country to adopt the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI).208 The EITI is a global initiative that promotes transparency
in company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and
mining.209 Countries voluntarily sign up to the EITI and report to an
internationally appointed independent auditor on a monthly basis.210
The Nigerian experiment with the EITI is ambitious and path
breaking.211 Audit reports were carried out between 1999 and 2004
and subsequently made available to the public. According to
Nicholas Shaxson of the British Think Tank, Chatham House:
These reports . . . contributed to significantly better
transparency in Nigeria’s oil industry, collecting and
publishing an array of detailed and useful information
for the first time. Nothing remotely like this has been
done before, let alone published. The reports went
far beyond the basic core requirements of global
EITI; it produced not only raw data on the industry
and on tax and other fiscal matters; but it also
provided crucial and useful insights into processes
involved in the industry that have helped many
insiders and outsiders to see the oil sector in overview
for the first time.212
2. Extractive Sector Regulatory Regime. – The Petroleum Act of
1969213 is the primary legislation underpinning the oil and gas

Id.
Nicholas Shaxson, Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
CHATHAM HOUSE (2009), http://eiti.org/files/NEITI%20Chatham%20house_0.
pdf.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 2.
213 Petroleum Act, ch. 350 (1969) (Nigeria),
207
208

204

2015

Scott Stedjan

3:2

regulatory regime in Nigeria. The Petroleum Act was enacted in the
midst of the Nigerian Civil War and vests the entire ownership and
control of all petroleum in, under, or upon, any lands in the country
to the government.214 While the government owns the oil, the
Petroleum Act further states that Nigerian citizens or companies
incorporated in Nigeria may be granted an oil exploration license, an
oil-prospecting license, or a lease to search for and carry away
petroleum.215 The holders of a license or lease are granted extensive
rights and powers over the land.216 The First Schedule of the
Petroleum Act limits the rights of lease or license holders by stating
that a licensee or lessee may not enter upon, occupy, or exercise any
of the rights and powers conferred by his license or lease over any
private land until “fair and adequate compensation has been paid to
the persons in lawful occupation of the land.”217 The First Schedule
also requires that within ten years of the enactment of the lease, at
least seventy-five percent of all employees hired by a lessee or
licensee must be Nigerian citizens.218
The Petroleum Act remains in force, but some of its
provisions that protect the rights of investors and communities were
overtaken by events.219 When Nigeria joined the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) in 1971, it began to
institute reforms in line with OPEC’s preference for indigenization of
oil industries.220 In 1972, the government announced that it assigned
all of the areas of the country not covered by an existing license or
lease to the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).221 In
order to take advantage of foreign capital and expertise, the NNPC
was authorized to form joint ventures with international
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/nig/petroleumact.pdf.
214 Id. § 1.
215 Id. § 2(1).
216 Yinka Omorogbe, The Legal Framework for the Production of Petroleum in
Nigeria, 5 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 273, 275 (1987).
217 Petroleum Act § 36.
218 Id.
219 Omorogbe, supra note 216, at 275-76.
220 Frynas, supra note 178, at 31.
221 Omorogbe, supra note 216, at 277.
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companies.222 From 1971, the government gradually set up joint
ventures with oil exploration and production companies and acquired
shareholding ventures.223 By 1979, the government had acquired a
sixty percent ownership of all major foreign oil companies in the
country.224
Under a joint venture model, the NNPC combined the
functions of an oil company with the regulatory powers of a
government ministry.225 This led to a “fox guarding the hen house”
situation where the incentives to regulate the industry based on social
and environmental needs of the Nigerian people were diminished.226
In March 1996, United States and Nigerian human rights groups
partnered to jointly submit a legal communication to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights alleging that Nigeria,
through a joint venture between NNPC and Shell International,
facilitated acts that were in violation of its commitments under the
African Charter.227 The complainants alleged that, because the FGN
was involved in oil production through the NNPC, it “did not
monitor or regulate the operations of oil companies, and in so doing
paved a way” for destruction of the environment and human rights
222 See Chudi Ubezonu, Doing Business in Nigeria by Foreigners: Some Aspects
of Law, Policy, and Practice, 28 INT’L LAW. 345, 359 (1994) (noting that before 1989 a
foreign company could only invest in Nigeria’s oil sector in the form of a joint
venture arrangement); see also Oserheimen A. Osunbor, Nigeria’s Investment Laws and
the State’s Control of Multinationals, 3 ICSID REV. 38 (1988).
223 Frynas, supra note 178, at 31.
224 Id. The sixty percent figure cited above exempts a production-sharing
agreement with Ashland and the Tenneco-Mobil-Sunray venture.
225 Id. at 33.
226 Tunde Morakinyo & Odigha Odigha, The Niger Delta and Oil
Exploration, Presentation to the 2009 Katoomba XV Conference, Accara, Ghana,
(Oct. 6-7, 2009), http://rmportal.net/library/content/translinks/translinks2009/forest-trends/2010-katoomba-xv-meeting-accraghana/Presentation_NigerDeltaOil.pdf.
227 Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic
Rights Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria), Case No.
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. May 27, 2002),
available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_9
6_eng.pdf.
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abuses.228 After finding Nigeria in violation of its African Charter
obligations, the Commission appealed to the FGN to ensure that
“the safe operation of any further oil development is guaranteed
through effective and independent oversight bodies for the
petroleum industry.”229
Many observers of Nigeria believe reform of the countries’
regulatory regime is past due.230 While privatization of the oil
industry proceeded steadily since the end of military rule231 and the
government transitioned to a policy of awarding all new contracts via
production sharing contracts232 instead of joint ventures, the basic
regulatory regime has remained more or less unchanged. Several
Id. ¶ 55.
Id.
230 SNR Denton, Nigerian Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, AFRICAN UPDATE
(Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2012/november/14/nigeriandraft-petroleum-industry-bill-2012 (stating that industry players are eagerly
anticipating and welcoming the notion of a more structured, consistent, and
transparent framework for the industry); see also Nigeria’s Oil: A Desperate Need of
Reform, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/middleeast-and-africa/21564906-goodluck-jonathan-says-he-wants-reform-oil-industryreally.
231 See generally Oil and Politics in Nigeria, PBS NEWSHOUR, Apr. 5, 2007,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/africa/nigeria/oil.html (noting
that President Olusegun Obasanjo introduced reforms in 2003 to privatize the
government-owned and -subsidized oil operations, or parastatals, partly in an
attempt to attract more capital investment and foreign business partners).
232 Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence As
A Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
395, 412 (2009) (Production sharing contracts are agreements “under which a
foreign company, serving as a contractor to the host country, recovers its costs
each year from production and is further entitled to receive a certain share of the
remaining production as payment in kind for the exploration risks assumed.”);
ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 72 (1994) (The switch to production sharing contracts has
been attributed to the government of Nigeria’s inability to adequately meet its cash
call obligations to fund joint venture operations); Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun,
Nigeria: Legal Framework Of The Nigerian Petroleum Industry, MONDAQ (Apr. 3, 2011),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/10726/Legal+Framework+Of+The+Nigerian+Petr
oleum+Industry.
228
229
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unsuccessful attempts have been made over the last decade to pass
reform legislation. Finally, in the spring of 2014, the passage of a
Petroleum Industry Bill,233 adjusting the fiscal and legal regime
governing the petroleum and natural gas industry, seems to be
gathering steam in the Nigerian National Assembly.234
The Petroleum Industry Bill seeks to reshape the entire oil
and gas industry in Nigeria.235 The Bill establishes a series of agencies
and positions charged with overseeing the industry, and introduces a
more transparent and competitive license award process.236 The
major oil companies are actively lobbying for changes in the bill and
their opposition has in part caused the delay.237 Discussion of the
233 The
Draft
Petroleum
Industry
Bill
(2012)
(Nigeria),
http://www.nigerialaw.org/Legislation/LFN/2012/The%20Petroleum%20Industry%20Bill%20%202012.pdf.
234 Nigeria: Petroleum Industry Bill to Be Passed Soon - Sen Nwaogu,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Dec. 26, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201212270299.html.
For details on what the Bill includes see KPMG, ADVISORY SERVICES PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY BILL 2012: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FISCAL PROVISIONS (Aug. 2012),
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxne
wsflash/Documents/nigeria-oct3-2012no1.pdf.
235 Draft Petroleum Industry Bill § 1(a-k) (Objectives include: enhance
exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in Nigeria and promote
petroleum production for the benefit of the Nigerian people; create a conducive
business environment for petroleum operations; establish a progressive fiscal
framework that encourages further investment in the petroleum industry whilst
optimizing accruable revenues to the Federal Government of Nigeria; establish a
commercially oriented and profit driven National Oil Company; deregulate and
liberalize the downstream petroleum sector; create an efficient and effective
regulatory entity; promote transparency, simplicity and openness; promote the
development of Nigerian content in the petroleum industry; protect health, safety
and environment; in the course of petroleum operations; and optimize domestic
gas supplies, in particular for power generation). Id.
236 Draft Petroleum Industry Bill § 190-1; see also SNR Denton, supra note
230.
237 See Elisha Bala-Gbogbo, Nigeria Bill Risks Output in Top African Oil
Country,
Shell
Says,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS,
Nov.
30,
2012,
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxne
wsflash/Documents/nigeria-oct3-2012no1.pdf; Pass Petroleum Industry Bill, Paul
Collier
Tells
Nigeria,
AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE,
Nov.
9,
2012,
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benefits and drawbacks of the Bill is beyond the scope of this
discussion,238 but passage of these reforms would address some of
the concerns of the African Commission and remove the cloud of
uncertainty facing investors.239
3. Land Use Act. – The Land Use Act of 1978 vested the
ownership of all land within a state to the governor of that state in an
effort to remove the traditional barrier to alienation of land and allow
for oil to be extracted cheaper and more efficiently.240 Prior to the
Land Act, the traditional land tenure system241 made it difficult to
purchase land owned by a community or family because the system
required oil companies to negotiate extraction rights with many
stakeholders.242
The Land Act is one of Nigeria’s most controversial laws,
because of the effect on both customary land rights and the inability

http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/pass-petroleum-industry-bill-paul-colliertells-nigeria/ (arguing that there are strong indications that one of the reasons
International Oil Companies (IOCs) are opposing the PIB is the lack of guarantees
to existing investors. Holders of existing joint-venture and Production Sharing
Contracts (PSC) licenses and leases would be required to re-apply for their
respective contracts within a year of the PIB’s passage).
238 For a detailed discussion on the bill with section by section
commentary, see ERNST & YOUNG, NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL – 2012
(2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Nigeria_Petroleum_Industry_Bill_
%E2%80%94_2012/$FILE/Nigeria_Petroleum_Industry_Bill_26Oct12_lowres.p
df.
239 See Camillus Eboh, Nigeria Oil Reforms to Be Taken-up by New Parliament,
REUTERS, June 1, 2011, 5:47 AM EST,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/01/nigeria-oil-reformsidUSLDE75019L20110601 (arguing that “[U]ncertainty over the Petroleum
Industry Bill . . . has left billions of dollars of potential investment on hold.”).
240 Land Use Act, ch.. 202, § 1(1) (1978) (Nigeria), http://www.nigerialaw.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm.
241 The traditional land tenure system was in effect in southern Nigeria.
The northern part of Nigeria operated under Islamic law and had a different land
system. See L. K. Agbosu, The Land Use Act and the State of Nigerian Land Law, 32 J.
AFRICAN LAW 1, 4-5 (1988).
242 Id.
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of communities to assert their rights in connection to oil
exploitation.243 Arguably the most controversial section of the Land
Act is Section 28, which provides that land may be appropriated for
“overriding public interest.”244 Overriding public interest in this
context includes “the requirement of the land for mining purposes or
oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith.”245 The Act
legitimized the expropriation of land from traditional communities
whenever oil interests were present and allowed oil companies to gain
easier access to the land and oil resources because companies were
not obliged to negotiate with landowners.246 After enactment of the
Land Use Act, all negotiations on the alienation of land were to go
through the state. Nigerian scholar Jedrzej Georg Frynas has argued
that as a consequence of the Land Act “companies had lesser
economic incentive to investigate the local patterns of land
ownership, which can partly explain the carelessness with which oil
companies deal with communities.”247
Both President’s Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar’Adua
advocated for reform or amendment of the Land Use Act.248 The
Legislature has failed to enact the proposed amendments to the Act
and no major progress has been seen during the Administration of
President Goodluck Jonathan.249

243 Rhuks T. Ako, Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental
Justice, 53 J. AFRICAN LAW 289, 289 (2009).
244 Land Use Act § 28.
245 Id. § 28(2)(c).
246 See Ako, supra note 243, at 294-95.
247 Frynas, supra note 178, at 80.
248 Otei Oham, Nigeria: Representatives Reject Yar’Adua’s Land Reform Bill,
DAILY INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 2010,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003240320.html; Presidential Committee Seeks Land
Reform Panel, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 2010,
http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=94072:presidential-committee-seeks-land-reform-panel&catid=1:national&Itemid=559.
249 See Emma Amaize, Ex-MEND Leaders Threaten Jonathan Over Land Use
Act, VANGUARD, July 22, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007220464.html.
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4. Investment Promotion and Protection. – While the government
of Nigeria, through the NNPC, was gaining a larger share of the oil
market and promoting an indigenization policy in the 1970s and 80s,
the government paradoxically also introduced new incentives for
foreign oil companies to stimulate new exploration.250 By the mid1990s, the Nigerian government was ready to promote international
investment and implement measures to protect foreign capital.251
The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commissions Act of 1995
(NIPC)252 is the primary legislation regulating foreign investment in
Nigeria.253 The law was amended in 1998 to include the petroleum
industry within its scope.254
Because the FGN feared foreign investors were reluctant to
invest in the country due to the indigenization program of the 1970s
and 1980s, and particularly the nationalization of British Petroleum
by the Nigerian Government in 1978,255 the NIPC Act provides

Frynas, supra note 178, at 33.
See generally Obida Gobna Wafure & Abu Nurudeen, Determinants of
Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis, 10 GLOBAL J. OF HUMAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE 26, 26 (2010) (reasoning that the new industrial policy of 1989,
the establishment of the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) in
early 1990s, and the signing of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in the late
1990s are all examples of the Nigerian authorities trying to attract FDI via various
reforms).
252 See Id. at 26. While passage of the amended NIPC Act preceded the
Obasanjo administration by a year, implementation of the NIPC Act was left to the
civilian authorities and is often grouped as part of the reforms initiated by the
civilian government.
253 Investment Promotion Commissions Act Decree No. (16) (1995)
(Nigeria),
http://www.nigerialaw.org/Nigerian%20Investment%20Promotion%20Commission% 20Act.htm; see
also Khrushchev U.K. Ekwueme, Nigeria’s Principle Investment Laws in the Context of
International Law and Practice, 49 J. AFRICAN LAW 177, 177 (2005).
254 Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 179.
255 See ANN WEYMOUTH GENOVA, OIL AND NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA,
1970-1980 125 (2007) (arguing that the FGN nationalization of BP was justified as
an effort to punish the United Kingdom for its failure to support anti-apartheid
efforts in South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, the public narrative leaves too
250
251
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concrete investment guarantees.256 Section 25 (1)-(2) of the NIPC
Act provides guarantees against nationalization and expropriation and
provides for fair and adequate compensation and access to courts
should land be expropriated.257
Additional guarantees against direct and indirect
expropriation have come in the form of bilateral investment treaties
and individual contract clauses.258 Nigeria currently has twenty-two
Bilateral Investment Treaties in effect259 that elect to have disputes of
all sorts settled by international arbitration forums such as at the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID).260 Section 26(2) of the NPC also allows for the parties to a
contract to determine how the dispute will be settled.261 Most

many gaps and argues that the nationalization fits within the larger trend of
economic nationalism that the military government was pursuing in the 1970s.).
256 Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 188.
257 Investment Promotion Commissions Act § 25(1)-(2) states:
“(a) No enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any
Government of the Federation; and
(b) No person who owns whether wholly or in part, the capital
of any enterprise shall be compelled by law to surrender his
interest in the capital to any other person.
(2) There shall be no acquisition of an enterprise to which
this Decree applies by the Federal Government unless this
acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose
and under a law which makes provisions for:
(a) payment of fair and adequate compensation; and
(b) a right of access to the courts for the determination of the
investor’s interest or right and the amount of
compensation to which he is entitled.”
258 See Duncan E. Alford, 36 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 506, 506 (2008)
(reviewing Khrushchev Ekwueme, et al., PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN CONTEXT: NIGERIA’S INVESTMENT LAWS, TREATIES, AND PETROLEUM
AGREEMENTS (2007)).
259 Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 198-202.
260 Id.
261 Investment Promotion Commissions Act § 26(2).
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Nigerian petroleum agreements contain local arbitration clauses and
are thus resolved in Nigerian arbitral tribunals.262
The enactment of the NIPC Act has not opened the
floodgates of new investment in Nigeria.263 While the risk of
expropriation diminished, other forms of risk remain high in Nigeria
and deter investment.264
B.

Reforms of Multinational Corporations

Because the Petroleum Act gives ownership of oil resources
to the government and the Land Use Act vests ownership over land
to state governors, multinational companies made the mistake of
believing the government was the only Nigerian stakeholder involved
in their business. This failure, combined with some heinous practices
by oil companies, produced severe reputational damage to companies
operating in Nigeria.265 The behavior of oil companies in Nigeria also
resulted in an increasing number of civil suits filed against
companies266 and violent conflicts between oil companies and village
communities.267 Multinational oil companies have thus adjusted their
behavior since 1995 by, among other things, implementing

Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 203.
Id.
264 Id. See also Alford, supra note 258, at 507 (noting that frequent changes
in government, the Biafran civil war, the continuing unrest in the Niger Delta, the
imposition of Sharia law in the northern states of Nigeria, endemic corruption,
armed violence, an erratic power supply, and a persistent shortage of fuel have
discouraged foreign investment).
265 See Paul Lewis, Rights Groups Say Shell Oil Shares Blame, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/11/world/rights-groups-sayshell-oil-shares-blame.html?ref=kensarowiwa.
266 See Frynas, supra note 129, at 371.
267 See generally INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, NIGERIA: OGONI LAND
AFTER SHELL 2-3 (2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/westafrica/nigeria/B054%20Nigeria%20Ogoni%20Land%20after%20Shell.pdf
(detailing the history and dynamic of the conflict between Shell and the Ogoni
people).
262
263
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development programs, adjusting environmental practices, and
engaging with communities.268
Generally, foreign investors can protect their investments
against political risk by structuring its business in a way that local
population have a stake in the project’s success.269 In the same way
that community opposition to an investment can lead to
governmental adversity to an investment, community interest in an
investment can lead to a stable investment environment.270 Often,
governments compel foreign investors to implement certain
measures aimed at building community support by host nation law.271
Some corporations, however, implemented policies on their initiative
to reduce reputational or legal risk272 or to gain consent from a local
community to carry out business activities in a certain area.273
1. Changes in behavior due to reputational risks. – Nigeria has
experienced a rise in litigation against international corporations since
268 See SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA, GAS
FLARING IN NIGERIA (2013), http://s02.static-shell.com/content/dam/shellnew/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/gas-flaring.pdf (Shell oil cut
gas flaring by seventy-five percent since 2003); SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY OF NIGERIA, IMPROVING THE LIVES OF THE NIGER DELTA (2012),
http://s07.staticshell.com/content/dam/shell/static/nga/downloads/pdfs/briefingnotes/improving-lives-2012.pdf (Shell contributed $83.5 million to development
initiatives (as required by law) in 2011, provided micro-credit that helped 30,000
people establish or expand businesses since 1998, and implemented a practice of
obtaining Memorandum of Understanding with communities and local
governments in 2006); see also CHEVRON CORP., Nigeria: In the Community,
http://www.chevron.com/countries/nigeria/inthecommunity/ (last modified Apr.
2012).
269 RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 40.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 David Spence, supra note 23, at 64-65; see also A Survey of Corporate
Social Responsibility: Just Good Business, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/node/10491077.
273 Sylvanus Elijah Abila & Damfebo K. Derri, Sustainable Development
Issues in the Niger Delta, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT
CHALLENGES 213, 227 (Festus Emirir & Gowon Deinduomo eds. 2009).
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the end of military rule in 1999.274 Litigation not only increased in
Nigerian courts, but companies from the United States have also
been hauled in front of U.S. courts and other international courts for
actions that occurred in Nigeria.275
As explained above, a company’s reputation has a direct
bearing on the likelihood of successful litigation.276 No other incident
impacted the reputation of oil companies in Nigeria more than the
violence and environmental degradation in Ogoniland.
Oil
companies gained billions of dollars from the oil extracted from the
land of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta since oil was discovered
there in the 1950s.277 Dissatisfied Ogoni leaders joined with
international campaigners in the 1990s in a campaign to address the
deleterious impact of oil exploitation.278 The Nigerian government
Frynas, supra note 129, at 371.
See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Nigerian citizens filed suit against Chevron, asserting claims under Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) that Chevron allegedly acted through Nigerian subsidiary to pay
Nigerian military to carry out attacks on offshore oil platform. Ninth Circuit
upheld jury verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims.); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted 132 S.Ct. 472 (Nigerian
residents filed putative class action, under Alien Tort Statute (ATS), claiming that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations engaged in oil exploration and
production aided and abetted Nigerian government in committing human rights
abuses. Second Circuit dismissed claims.); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jad Mauoawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian
Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html?_r=0 (Shell
settled out-of-court with the Saro-Wiwa family for $15.5 million in 2009); see also,
Ivana Sekularac & Anthony Deutsch, Nigerian Villagers Sue Shell in Landmark
Pollution
Case,
REUTERS,
Oct.
11,
2012,
11:24
AM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/us-shell-nigeria-lawsuitidUSBRE8991SE20121011 (discussing case against Shell in the Netherlands);
Alexis Flynn, Shell Faces Two Nigerian Spill Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304636404577299733426
445746?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%
2FSB10001424052702304636404577299733426445746.html.
276 See Frynas, supra note 129, at 147-48.
277 See Richard Boele, Heike Fabig & David Wheeler, Shell, Nigeria and the
Ogoni I: A Study in Unsustainable Development, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 74, 74 (2001).
278 Id.
274
275
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responded to this campaign through repressive tactics that resulted in
thousands of Ogoni deaths and numerous other serious human rights
abuses.279 Under pressure from the Ogoni and international NGOs,
Shell was forced to pull out from Ogoniland in 1993.280
In response to the Ogoniland tragedy and other situations
that led to reputational damage, oil companies in Nigeria took action
to improve their environmental and human rights practices.281 While
oil companies undertook social responsibility initiatives for decades,
the quality of the investments greatly improved since 1995.282 Since
then, Shell International, for example, “has re-invented its corporate
strategy in line with principles of sustainable development and it has
committed itself to a level of stakeholder engagement on its
environmental and social performance which would have been
unthinkable in 1995.”283 Prior to 1995, Shell “placed emphasis on
one-time ‘gifts,’ rather than support for sustainable development
programs.”284 Previous development initiatives were uncoordinated
and focused on what Shell felt the communities needed, as opposed
to engaging the communities in their own development and making
communities stakeholders in Shell’s projects.285 Instead of a top
down approach, Shell’s new approach “places emphasis on the
empowerment of communities” and empowers communities and
local governments to produce development plans, in which
communities set their own development priorities.286

279 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 184 (exploration of
human rights violations related to oil exploration and production in the Niger
Delta).
280 See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 267, at 1.
281 Uwem E. Ite, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in
Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria, 11 CORP. SOC. RESPONSIB. ENVIRON.
MGMT 1, 4 (2004).
282 Id.
283 Boele, supra note 277, at 74.
284 Ite, supra note 281, at 5.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 6.
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2. Changes in behavior due to government regulation. – In addition to
actions taken by investors to improve their reputation and guard
against the risk of litigation, the FGN enacted laws that guide the
behavior of oil and gas companies. The Nigerian Oil and Gas
Industry Content Development Act of 2010 is intended to support
economic development by promoting indigenous service providers
and locally supplied goods to support the oil and gas industry.287 The
law sets minimum thresholds for the use of local labor, services, and
materials,288 with a goal of embedding the oil industry within the
wider Nigerian economy by creating economic linkages between
Nigerian businesses and the oil and gas companies.289 According to
an analysis by KPMG, “if properly implemented, the Act has the
potential to facilitate the participation of Nigerians in the oil and gas
sector, and stimulate the development of other sectors of the
economy, especially the manufacturing sector.”290
Another way the Government is using law to change the
behavior of oil companies is to require companies to set aside funds
for local development initiatives. The Niger-Delta Development
Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act291 requires an oil producing or

Soji Awogbade, The New Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content
Development Act – A Game Changer, BUSINESS DAY (Nigeria), Apr. 29, 2010,
http://www.businessdayonline.com/ARCHIVE
/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=10547:the-new-nigerian-oiland-gas-industry-content-development-act-a-gamechanger&catid=133:legalindignity&Itemid =557.
288 Id.
289 KPMG,
NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY CONTENT
DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2010 1 (2010),
http://www.kpmg.com/NG/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docume
nts/Newsletter%20on%20Nigerian%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Industry%20Conte
nt%20Development%20Act%20-%20June%202010.pdf.
290 Id.
291 Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act
(Nigeria), Act. No. (6) (July 12, 2000),
http://www.commonlii.org/ng/legis/num_act/ndcea504/. For a detailed analysis
of the act, see Nelson E. Ojukwu-Ogba, Legislating Development in Nigeria’s OilProducing Region: The NDDC Act Seven Years On, 17 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 136
(2009).
287
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gas processing company operating in the Niger-Delta Area to pay
three percent of its total annual budget to a Development
Commission.292 The Development Commission is charged with
formulating development policies and implementing development
programs focused on transportation, health, education, employment,
industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban
development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications.293
The proposed Petroleum Industry Bill discussed above294 also creates
a Petroleum Host Communities Fund to be filled by a requirement
that upstream petroleum companies295 contribute ten percent of their
net profits to the Fund on a monthly basis.296 The Fund will direct
money to the development of the economic and social infrastructure
of communities in petroleum producing areas.297
The reforms described above, in addition to other reforms
not mentioned, have helped the Nigerian economy grow an average
of 7.6% between 2003 and 2010.298 Unfortunately, the benefits have
not reached the average Nigerian. According to the U.S. Agency for
International Development, “while the successive administrations of
Presidents Obasanjo and Yar’Adua have enacted broad . . . policy
reforms, the implementation of these reforms has yet to register

Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act,
supra note 291, § 14(2)(b).
293 Id. § 7(b).
294 The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, supra note 233.
295 The upstream sector includes the searching for potential underground
or underwater oil and gas fields, drilling of exploratory wells, and subsequently
operating the wells that recover and bring the crude oil and/or raw natural gas to
the surface. Conversely, the downstream sector is defined as an oil sector term
commonly used to refer to the refining of crude oil, and the selling and distribution
of natural gas and products derived from crude oil. OIL & GAS IQ, IQ GLOSSARY,
http://www.oilandgasiq.com/glossary.
296 The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, supra note 233, §§ 116-119.
297 Id. § 118.
298 WORLD BANK, NIGERIA: MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND
DELIVERING
SERVICES
TO
THE
POOR
1
(2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/731531302790208764/IDA_AT_WORK_Nigeria_2011.pdf (updated Apr. 2011).
292
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significant impact on the daily lives of ordinary Nigerians.”299 The
main reason for the failure of these reforms to reach ordinary
Nigerians is the lack of strong governance institutions, especially at
the state level, and a weak, non-oil economy.300 Decades of military
rule and underinvestment in the non-oil sector will not be erased in
one or two decades. If Nigeria continues along its current trajectory,
however, it may finally be able to escape the resource curse.

III.

APPLYING LESSONS FROM NIGERIA TO LAND INVESTMENT IN
SOUTH SUDAN

Governments and investors can draw many lessons from the
Nigerian experience in oil exploitation. Nigeria’s experience shows
that large-scale natural resource exploitation comes with multiple
risks to all stakeholders. Large-scale resource exploitation when state
institutions are weak, corruption is rampant, and rights of
populations are ill defined may lead to a situation where the benefits
of the resource extraction do not reach the population, and investors
face significant political risk. Nigeria’s reform efforts have also
shown, however, that effective policies and legal frameworks may
reduce risk.
Governmental efforts at combating corruption,
improving governance, creating an effective legal framework for
investment, and cooperating with investors to reconcile the
objectives of investors with the development needs of communities
may lead to benefits to all stakeholders.
The remainder of this article will use the Nigerian example to
provide eight recommendations for the GoSS and investors looking
to enter the South Sudanese land market that will reduce political risk
and help ensure the investment is beneficial to both investors and the
people of South Sudan.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT, NIGERIA STRATEGY, 20102013 1 (2010), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP977.pdf.
300 WORLD BANK, supra note 298, at 2.
299
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Lesson 1: The Government and investors must engage in meaningful
consultations with communities prior to investment.
Government promotion of land investment in South Sudan is
an appropriate response to the food security and developmental
needs of the country. However, the pace of large-scale land
investment should slow in order to ensure the provisions of the 2009
Land Act are effectively implemented. The Land Act provides a
useful framework for allowing investment in a sustainable and
consultative manner. According to the Act, the Ministry granting the
lease must ensure that “the members of the community are duly
consulted . . . and the project for which the land has been leased
contributes to the social and economic development of the
community, the County or/and the State.”301 The Act goes further
and requires that customary land rights only be granted as a lease to
international investors if there is “consensus between members of the
community.”302
Implementing these provisions will likely frustrate investors
and government officials who want to speed up the pace of
investment. However, given Sudan’s history with conflict and civil
unrest caused by disputes over land rights, these measures are
absolutely essential. Populations must not only be consulted; they
must have the ability to refuse an investment contract. In Nigeria,
the Land Use Act vested the authority to grant leases to the state
governor without consultations with the community. This mode led
to a situation where the oil companies believed the government was
the only stakeholder and acted carelessly toward the local population.
South Sudan has wisely adopted a different approach. The GoSS
must rigorously implement these provisions of the Land Act because
the investment provides benefits to both investors and the South
Sudanese if power is given to local communities.

301
302

The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 27(4).
Id. § 27(1).
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Lesson 2: The Government must aggressively combat corruption.
Corruption creates distrust between the government,
investors, and the public, and thus must be urgently addressed if
South Sudan is going to have any chance of creating an enabling
environment for mutually beneficial land investment. Nigeria
continually struggled with corruption at levels that rival or exceed the
levels of corruption in South Sudan. In response to endemic
corruption, both countries established independent anti-corruption
commissions that take decisions over whether to investigate and
prosecute government officials outside the political process. South
Sudan is now faced with similar issues to what Nigeria faced in 2002
when, prior to the amending of the Corrupt Practices Act, power to
prosecute corruption was concurrently vested in an independent anticorruption commission and the Ministry of Justice. Because there
was a perceived competition between the Ministry and the
independent commission, the Nigerian legislature decided to vest sole
prosecutorial authority in the Attorney-General.303 South Sudan
similarly has vested prosecutorial duties to both an independent anticorruption commission and the Ministry of Justice.304 The GoSS
need not decide to vest sole authority in one entity over the other.
Concurrent authority has worked in other countries and has the
potential to succeed in South Sudan.305 However, the GoSS must

See Ogbu, supra note 192, at 130-31.
See Turuk, supra note 115.
305 See generally John R. Heilbrunn, WORLD BANK INST., Anti-Corruption
Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? (2004),
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/AntiCorruption%20Commissions%20by%20John%20Heilbrunn.pdf
(noting
the
success of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption and arguing
that the first key variable that might explain a failure to reduce corruption through
the establishment of an anti-corruption agency is the absence of laws necessary for
its success. Without the legal tools to go after venal officials, a commission cannot
succeed.); Melissa Khemani, Anticorruption Commissions in the African State: Burying the
Problem or Addressing the Issue? (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1353586_code1176273.pdf?abstractid=1334286&miri
d=5 (arguing that anti-corruption commissions can play a critical role in the anti303
304
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make a decision to either build up the prosecutorial powers and
political will of the Commission or to grant sole authority to the
Attorney General. Without the legal tools and strong political
backing, no independent commission will succeed.306
Lesson 3: The Government must limit expropriation of customary land
to truly public purposes.
Implementing the Land Act requires the government to
ensure that any expropriation of private or community held lands is
legitimate. Like the Land Use Act of Nigeria, the South Sudan Land
Act allows the government to expropriate land for “public
purposes.”307 Yet, unlike Nigeria’s law, where public purposes
embrace “the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil
pipelines or for any purpose connected therein,” the South Sudan
Land Act defines public purposes in a relatively narrow way.308
However, the South Sudan Land Act also includes a clause that states
that a public purpose can include “any activity with a public purpose
undertaken by the government as specified by any other law.”309
South Sudan’s government must ensure that it does not interpret this
provision to include promotion of land investment notwithstanding
the communities’ right to refuse an investment.

corruption strategies of African states, provided they have certain structures,
functions and characteristics).
306 Heilbrunn, supra note 305, at 15.
307 The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 73.
308 Id. § 73(5) (Public Purposes is defined by the Act as: (a) exclusive for
government or general public use; (b) planning of any new Government area or the
extension or improvement of any existing Government premises; (c) sanitary
improvements and urban development; (d) social housing, resettlement and
reintegration; (e) control over land contiguous to any port, airstrip or airport; (f)
control over land required for defense purposes; (g) control over land whose values
enhanced by the construction of any railway, road, or public works about to be
undertaken or provided by the Government; and (h) any other activity with a
public purpose undertaken by the government as specified by any other law).
309 Id. § 73(5)(h).
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Lesson 4: Investors must guard against indirect expropriation.
While the legal regime established by the South Sudanese
Land and Investment Promotion Acts provides protection for
investors against direct expropriation of its investment, investors still
must face the risk of indirect expropriation.310 Government action,
such as increased regulation or a drastic change in the legal or tax
environment, which “would have the effect of depriving the owner,
in whole or significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit or property”311 remains a risk.312
Investors in South Sudan can learn from the Nigerian
experience. With great changes in society, like when Nigeria joined
OPEC in 1971 or the end of military rule in 1999, come significant
regulatory changes. These changes may have an adverse impact on
particular investment ventures. Protections for investors found in
the Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969 were effectively ignored once
Nigeria joined OPEC. Further, reforms of the oil industry outlined
earlier in this paper could have great impacts on the ability of
investors to enjoy the benefits of their assets. South Sudan, as a new
state, will be crafting a large amount of legislation in the coming years
and the stability of the government remains in question as peace
negotiations between rival factions continue. Once an investment is
made and infrastructure is developed, investors become vulnerable to
changes in the local laws regulations and government policies.313
Investors must therefore find protection against “creeping”
expropriation.314

See Marina Azzimonti & Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte, Barriers to Foreign
Direct Investment Under Political Instability, 93 ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 287, 289 (2007)
(countries that have higher political instability are predicted to exhibit higher levels
of indirect expropriation).
311 Metaclad, supra note 76, ¶ 103.
312 Azzimonti & Sarte, supra note 310, at 289.
313 See COTULA, supra note 86, at 40.
314 See RUBINS &KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 183 (creeping expropriation
may occur where a series of State acts have a cumulative effect of depriving an
asset of its value).
310
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Investors in Nigeria and beyond use a variety of tactics to
guard against indirect expropriations. Such tactics include Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), stabilization clauses in contracts, and
political risk insurance. South Sudan has not entered into any BITs
at the time of writing. Yet stabilization clauses in contracts may serve
some of the same ends as BITs and could be included in land
contracts. Stabilization clauses may prohibit the application of any
new laws or regulations to an investment.315 Other forms of
stabilization clauses would apply new laws and regulations to the
investment, but require the state to fully compensate the investor for
any compliance costs.316 While stabilization clauses are controversial,
especially when a country is implementing non-discriminatory
regulations aimed at promoting human rights or environmental
protection, these clauses can provide predictability and protect
investments from regulatory expropriation.317
The purchase of political risk insurance is one of the simplest
steps an investor can take to mitigate political risk.318 Insurance is
available through private insurance companies, state-sponsored
investment agencies, such as the United States’ Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), and multilateral agencies, such as
the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA).
Both OPIC and MIGA protect against indirect expropriation and
political violence.319 At the same time, the simple purchasing of
insurance through a World Bank or U.S.-government-associated
entity may reduce political risk because the GoSS has an interest in
maintaining a productive relationship with both entities.320

315
316
317
318
319
320

Telesetsky, supra note 81, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 69.
Id. at 70-109.
Id. at 113.
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Lesson 5: The Government must not give up its police powers through
contracts.
There is a thin line between the sovereign right of a state to
regulate its economy and the act of indirect expropriation.321 The
GoSS, however, must find a way to effectively regulate its economy
while at the same time promote secure investments. According to
Lorenzo Cotula, “these tensions between investment protection and
sustainable development goals call for the development of innovative
approaches that can reconcile the investors’ legitimate need to ensure
stability of the investment climate with efforts to maximize the
contribution of foreign investment to the pursuit of sustainable
development goals.”322
The Nigerian government failed at reconciling the goals of
investment stability and sustainable development. The FGN erected
a regulatory regime in the 1960s and 70s that promoted investment at
the expense of oversight, transparency, and due process.323 Because
the FGN gained a majority stake in the oil companies in the 1970s,
the incentives for holding these companies accountable and ensuring
fair competition were diminished. To its credit, the FGN is
attempting to change the dynamics through passage of the Petroleum
Industry Bill. Yet, the process has proven difficult, and it is not clear
how easy it will be to make the petroleum industry more accountable
and transparent when much of the industry is operating under long321 OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS,
“INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION” AND THE “RIGHT TO REGULATE” IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 43 (2005), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/finance-and-investment/international-investment-law-achanging-landscape_9789264011656-en#page1.
322 LORENZO COTULA, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INT’L INV.,
REGULATORY TAKINGS, STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
3
(Mar.
27-28,
2008),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf.
323 See generally Decision Regarding Communication 155/96, supra note
227, ¶ 55 (finding that the FGN did not monitor or regulate the operations of oil
companies, and in so doing “paved a way” for destruction of the environment and
human rights abuses).
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term contracts. Nigeria has signed twenty-two bilateral investment
treaties that insulate investments from major changes in regulatory
approaches,324 and the political power of oil companies remains
strong.325
The GoSS must learn from Nigeria’s failures and implement a
regulatory regime that protects community land rights and ensures
the benefit of investment is shared by shareholders and communities
alike. South Sudan must take particular care not to give up its power
to regulate through contracts or BITs. Because South Sudan has yet
to enter any BITs, it can start with a clean slate and ensure the public
interest is not compromised by allowing investments to shield
themselves from non-discriminatory regulations. South Sudan
should require, as a prerequisite for entering any BITs, language that
allows it to establish its own level of environmental protection and
human rights standards.326 This approach has been implemented by
the Belgium-Luxembourg and Ethiopia BIT327 and the USA-Rwanda
Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 198-202.
See generally Nils Klawitter, Battling Big Oil: How Four Nigerian Villagers
Took
Shell
to
Court,
DER
SPIEGAL
(Jan.
29,
2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/nigerian-farmers-take-on-shell-in-adutch-court-a-880159.html (stating that individuals filing a lawsuit against Shell will
be facing an armada of lawyers); Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, PIB - Oil Majors Lobby
Senators, Govt Officials Over Fiscal Provisions, THIS DAY, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201210020070.html (“Multinational oil companies are
said to have spent millions of dollars lobbying the National Assembly and top
government officials to address their concerns over the fiscal provisions in the new
Petroleum Industry Bill.”).
326 Such an approach could follow the Article 12 of the BIT between
Mauritius and Comoros in 2001, which states: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting any measure whatsoever to
protect its essential security interests or in the interest of public health or the
prevention of diseases affecting animals and plants.” Agreement Concerning the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mauritius – Comoros, May
18, 2001,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.169.01.0001.01.ENG.
327 Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Belg.-Lux.-Eth., Oct. 26, 2006,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/360.
324
325
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BIT.328 Likewise, South Sudan should limit the scope of stabilization
clauses it signs with investors. Stabilization clauses may be
appropriate in certain circumstances, but only if these clauses do not
require the Government to abdicate its police powers.329 According
to Anastasia Telesetsky:
We should expect States to demand more of their
private investors. States with the ability to lease
arable land have a high demand commodity and need
not be cowed by sophisticated private investors who
present a ‘take it or leave it’ offer . . . States should
demand contract . . . conditions that will create an
investment climate which not only protects investors’
expectations but also safeguards the public interest in
a safe environment and meaningful employment.330
Lesson 6: The Government must ensure agreements are transparent.
According to a study by the Economist, land deals in Africa are
“shrouded in secrecy.”331 Transparency in land investment can help
set the conditions for greater competition among investors.
Transparency also fosters public confidence in land investment by
foreigners because contract awards would be subject to public
scrutiny.332
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative

328 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 110-23, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2241.
329 See COTULA, supra note 322, at 13-16.
330 Telesetsky, supra note 81, at 28.
331 Outsourcing’s Third Wave: Buying Farmland Abroad, ECONOMIST, May 21,
2009,
http://www.economist.com/node/13692889?subjectid=478044&story_id=136928
89.
332 THE WORLD BANK ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (RAI) THAT RESPECT RIGHTS, LIVELIHOODS AND
RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE PLATFORM FOR RESPONSIBLE AGROINVESTMENT
(RAI)
–
EXTENDED
VERSION
9
(2010),

227

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

implemented by Nigeria was ambitious.333 It informed the public and
policymakers on the activities of oil companies and equipped civil
society with a tool to hold their government accountable.334 South
Sudan can learn from this experience and implement policies that
provide information on pending contracts and existing allocations of
land in a publicly assessable registry.335 Such a registry should include
meaningful information such as: the price paid for the property,
projections on use and cultivation targets, employment generated,
and expected tax revenue. This information would enable civil
society to take a more active role in land decisions. A land registry
would also lower transaction costs borne by investors who currently
must expend funds to investigate whether the claimed owner has
good title.336
Lesson 7: The Government and investors should negotiate contracts that
prioritize local food security and development.
Because South Sudan suffers from food insecurity and
underdevelopment, structuring land investment in a way that will
contribute to, rather than undermine, food security and development
is the utmost priority.337 Both investors and governments have a role
to play in ensuring food security. A joint United Nations and World
Bank report argues that while it is unrealistic to expect investors to
make food security their primary concern, slight modifications of
project design can have a major impact on the nutrition of local
populations at little extra cost to investors.338

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/2145741111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf [hereinafter RAI].
333 Shaxson, supra note 208, at 2.
334 Id. at 7.
335 RAI, supra note 332, at 9.
336 See RAI, supra note 332, at 9. Such a registry would also prevent
situations like that of Lainay County, where the investor acquired 600,000 acres in a
County comprised of other a little more than half that amount. See supra Part
II.B.2.
337 See generally WORLD FOOD PROGRAM, supra note 144 (showing the
food security situation in South Sudan).
338 RAI, supra note 332, at 7.
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The GoSS must address food insecurity in a variety of ways.
The larger approach to food security is beyond the scope of this
article. Yet, as it relates to land investment, there are at least three
things the GoSS must do. First, South Sudan should consider
implementing temporary export restrictions on food that limit the
amount of food investors may export when food insecurity is
acute.339 Second, the Government should negotiate contracts that
require products to be grown that align with local dietary
preferences.340 Finally, the GoSS must fully integrate investment
plans within a larger development strategy.
South Sudan has wisely embedded foreign investment in land
within its National Development Plan through the 2011 Draft Land
Policy.341 Yet, equally important is to ensure that investment plans
and contracts promote development initiatives.
Large-scale
agriculture based only on ad hoc decisions by often ill-informed
investors might not correspond to a host community’s best interest
in the long run.342 The GoSS must undertake legislative efforts and
negotiate contracts that ensure land investments contribute to its
national strategy for agriculture or rural development.”343
Nigeria’s efforts to promote indigenous service and sourcing
industries through the Oil and Gas Industry Content Development
Act of 2010 is one way of linking investment projects to
339 South Sudan is not a member of WTO and has not adopted the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, such export
restrictions are consistent with GATT article XI:2(a) (GATT’s prohibition on
quantitative export restrictions does not apply to “export prohibitions or
restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs
or other products essential to the exporting contracting party”). See Julia Ismar,
How to Govern the Global Rush for Land and Water, in HANDBOOK OF LAND AND
WATER GRABS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER
SECURITY 286, 290 (Tony Allan et al. eds. 2013); see also Joachim von Braun & Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, supra note 39.
340 RAI, supra note 332, at 6.
341 See SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 120,
at 72.
342 DEININGER, supra note 5, at 112.
343 Id.
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development initiatives.344 South Sudan should consider passing
appropriate legislation requiring large scale agricultural projects to
hire local workers, train workers on mechanized farming techniques,
and require local sourcing of seed, fuel, and other inputs. Additional
legislation similar to Nigeria’s Niger-Delta Development Commission
(Establishment, etc.) Act345 requiring investors to contribute to
development funds is also something that South Sudan should
consider.
Even if a land deal seems to be beneficial to the development
of the country as a whole, there may be local social and economic
impacts that must be addressed prior to a land transfer.346 The GoSS
should thus require social and environmental impact assessments
prior to the transfer of land. This requirement could be embedded in
the lease contract or through passing a national law that requires an
impact assessment to be carried out.347
Lesson 8: Investors must practice Corporate Social Responsibility
Because community attitudes toward an investor could
damage an investment or the investor’s reputation, practicing socially
responsible behavior is not simply charity; socially responsible
practices are necessary to minimize political and reputational risks.348
Because the community’s right to land has been undermined by
colonialism, years of war with its northern neighbor, and tribal
conflict,349 issues of land and food production are highly emotive for

See Awogbade, supra note 287; KPMG, supra note 289, at 1.
See Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act,
supra note 291, § 7(b).
346 COTULA, supra note 86, at 30.
347 See id.
348 See generally U.N. FOOD AND AGRIC. AGENCY, FROM LAND GRAB TO
WIN-WIN: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN
AGRICULTURE 2 (2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/ak357e/ak357e00.pdf
(arguing that realizing the benefits of land investment will take efforts of both
investors and recipients. “Above all, it requires an understanding that collaboration
promises mutual benefits.”).
349 Id.
344
345
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the South Sudanese.350 How a community interacts and feels about
an investment in such an environment will have as much impact on
the productivity of the investment as market forces. Further, nonprofit campaigns focusing on the impact of land investment in the
developing world are starting to have an impact351 and have the
potential to severely damage an investor’s reputation. The Nigerian
experience has shown these campaigns could lead to costly litigation
and changes in the regulatory framework under which investors
operate.352
The experience of oil companies in Nigeria is particularly
instructive in the area of social responsibility. It seems from Shell’s
recent social responsibility practices353 that the company has learned
that their investments operate within a set of social norms and
community expectations.
Shell seems to have learned that
empowering the community and giving everyday Nigerians a voice in
their own future is an essential part of their efforts to minimize
political and reputational risk.354
Land investors in South Sudan should not only attempt to
follow the example of Shell, but to exceed it. Shell’s reputation has

See DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 15.
See, e.g., Josh Kron, In Scramble for Land, Group Says, Company Pushed
Ugandans
Out,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
21,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/africa/in-scramble-for-land-oxfamsays-ugandans-were-pushed-out.html?_r=0Oxfam;
Press
Release,
Oxfam
International, Investigation into Uganda “Land Grab” Must Be Genuinely
Independent
and
Transparent
(Oct.
4,
2011),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/pressroom/pressrelease/2011-1004/investigation-nfc-uganda-land-grab-must-be-independent-transparent (noting
that the World Bank has called for an investigation into land grabbing claims in
Uganda).
352 See Frynas, supra note 129, at 371.
353 Spence, supra note 23, at 60-61.
354 See generally Ite, supra note 281, at 5-7 (“Shell has departed from the
community assistance (CA) mode to the community development (CD) approach.
The CD approach places emphasis on the empowerment of communities with a
view to significantly reducing dependence on Shell for socio-economic
development.”).
350
351
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suffered from decades of neglecting the needs and desires of
communities in their project areas. Land investors should strive from
the outset of an investment to not only increase shareholder value
but to generate tangible benefits for the communities in the project
area. This would require at the least: (1) respecting internationally
relevant human rights and labor standards;355 (2) subscribing to
voluntary guidelines on land investment developed by international
organizations356 and those endorsed by the African Union;357 (3)
engaging with local communities to identify social risks, especially the
risks to women and vulnerable groups, and implementing risk
mitigation plans; (4) hiring local workers for higher skill work when
possible; and (5) rigorously complying with government regulations
and respecting existing land rights.
Finally, none of the socially responsible practices listed above
will succeed if the project itself is not economically viable and fails to
result in durable shareholder value.358 All parties will lose if an
investment is not economically successful. Investors must be wary of
investments that are only economically viable when food and energy
prices are high and would fail under normal market conditions.359
The increase in investment in African agricultural land has occurred
at a blistering speed and the long-term economic viability of these
projects is still unknown. Because the economic decisions taken by
investors will have major repercussions for the livelihoods of people
355 Such standards are outlined in the U.N. Global Compact and the
ILO’s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
356 See, e.g., WORLD BANK ET AL., Principles for Responsible Agricultural
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.II/CRP.3
(Apr. 16, 2010).
357 See, e.g., AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, AND
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, Framework and Guidelines for Land Policy in
Africa (Sept. 2010),
http://rea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Framework%20and%20Guidelines%20on
%20Land%20Policy%20in%20Africa.pdf.
358 Harold Liversage, INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT, Responding to ‘Land Grabbing’ and Promoting Responsible Investment in
Agriculture
9
(IFAD
Occasional
Paper
2,
2010),
http://www.ifad.org/pub/op/2_e.pdf.
359 See RAI, supra note 332, at 13.
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in the project area, the stakes are particularly high. Investors must
not enter into contracts lightly and without doing all they can to
ensure the project is viable.

CONCLUSION
International investment in agriculture plays a vital role in
development and poverty reduction. Yet, international investors
operating in South Sudan face many risks: the lack of predictable
regulation, an unproven government, corruption, civil unrest, and
reputational risks.360 Land investment also brings many risks to
communities: the erosion of land rights, uneven development,
environmental degradation, and violent conflict spurred by unmet
expectations.361
This article argues these risks are not
insurmountable. The experience of international investment in the
oil sector in Nigeria has shown that with effective government
regulation and a combination of successful risk management and
responsible practices by investors, there is hope that international
investment would meet the expectations of investors, governments,
and communities.362
The task of transforming large-scale land investment from a
challenge to an opportunity will not be easy. In order to meet the
challenge, the Government of South Sudan should slow international
investment to ensure the rights of landholders are secured, the
challenge of corruption is addressed, and that land investment is
integrated into its national development and food security
strategies.363 Investors must likewise take efforts to secure their
investment against the risk of indirect expropriation, engage in
meaningful consultations with communities, ensure investments

360
361
362

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 169-87.
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contribute to food security, and practice corporate responsible
practices.364
Since the end of military rule in 1999, investors and the
Government of Nigeria transformed themselves from the poster
child of the resource curse into something closer to being called a
success story. Nigeria still has a long way to go. But the reforms
undertook by the FGN and investors since 1999 shows that a
reform-minded government and investors willing to take the
necessary steps to protect investments and all stakeholders can pave
the way for mutually beneficial investment.
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